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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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THEATER FORCES NETHERLANDS

POLITICIAN CALLS FOR DECISION ON THE STATIONING

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 18 Dec 81 p 7

[Article by H. Wiegel, VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] parliamentary leader in the Second Chamber]

Text7 The Dutch government promised 2 years ago that it now would make a decision about the eventual stationing of cruise missiles on Netherlands' territory. The Dutch government informed the allies last week that it still cannot make this decision. What has happened that it cannot keep its promise?

Whoever surveys the period of detente comes to the conclusion that the Soviet Union has strived accordingly for military superiority in every field. It is now generally recognized that the military balance is now shifting slowly but surely in its favor. The stationing of SS-20 missiles began in 1976, the year when President Carter decided on a program which reduced the American military effort. In 1977 the American Secretary of State Vance went to Moscow with far-reaching proposals for disarmament, which the Soviet Union rejected.

The invasion of Afghanistan explains what happens when the Soviet Union does not get a clear signal. Since the United States had shown a moderate interest in that country for a number of years, the Soviet Union came to a wrong conclusion about that. When has an expansionist dictatorship ever restrained itself because of the other side's indulgence? In the fall of 1979 Gromyko said: if NATO makes the dual decision, that destroys the basis for negotiations. However when that decision was made, as a "clear signal" that NATO was serious, Helmut Schmidt began to hear in Moscow that the USSR was still ready to negotiate.

The United States Government has few reasons to look back with satisfaction on the last 10 years. The Vietnamese War ended in an ignominious retreat. The war also could not be justified for a democracy such as America, where public opinion reacts so quickly and sensitively to what the media shows. Taking the hostages in Teheran increased

unrest in the United States. It is remarkable that the Russian embassies are never occupied. Could that be because they are afraid of the Russian reaction? It appears as if a sort of economy of force exists: the clearer they make it that they will not hesitate to use it, the less they need to use it. Clear signals are required.

They also had exaggerated expectations for detente in Washington. In 1972 the Soviet Union promised not to obtain any unilateral advantages and to limit armament. The opposite happened. What was the European reaction to these events? Was not our protest against the Vietnamese war somewhat petty? Where are the people now who cried out then: Ho-ho-ho Chi Minh? They have shifted their protest to other fields. For those boat people, these mass executions in Cambodia, all that did not fit in with the image that they had formed.

European support for American measures against Iran was half-hearted. Gradually the impression was confirmed that many in Western Europe thought it less necessary to make a choice between the United States and the Soviet Union. The speech which Den Uyl gave a year ago in California, definitely did not eliminate that impression.

Constructive Policy

Why does everyone only cry out now about the armaments race, when the first cruise missiles have just been produced and not in 1976 when the SS-20s were stationed? The statement of the German liberal statesman Walter Scheel is confirmed more and more: the Americans have rescued democracy in Europe twice in this century; the Europeans repaid this debt with sporadic thanks and constant touchiness.

After the period of confusion which seems to unavoidably accompany each new administration, the American government has now decided on a constructive policy. Its program for strategic forces is under the

SALT-2 ceiling. President Reagan's speech about the Geneva negotiations was a "clear signal" which was greeted with approval by many in Europe. That new American policy also deserves our support. A strong and self-confident America is also in our interest. It would be desirable if Dutch politicians would venture to come out in favor of it.

This does not mean that we must swallow every word which comes out of Washington. It does mean that we must regard the unity of the West, as it is expressed in NATO, as a very great benefit and that we must not break that unity without very valid reasons. Those very valid reasons have been lacking so far. The aim of the SS-20 arsenal is to intimidate Western Europe. NATO cannot possibly allow the building up of that arsenal without an answer. The failure of an answer to appear would mean a green light for the Soviet Union to continue in that direction.

A "clear signal" is necessary to convince the Kremlin that there is no alternative to negotiations. That signal is the unanimous intention to station modernized nuclear weapons on European territory, unless the USSR proceeds with a considerable reduction of its missiles aimed at Europe. As I hope, it will never come to that stationing. The negotiations, which certainly will last a long time, must settle that. Ho ever, if results are too long in coming, then we will have to proceed with that. For by that stationing the Soviet Union will be forced to the conclusion that a European conflict will rapidly escalate to a world war, which is the strongest incentive to never begin such a conflict.

That reasoning is convincing and is also followed by the large European countries. Why does the Netherlands delay? The most important reason which is advanced is this: we can decide whether we will proceed with the stationing or not, only when the negotiations in Geneva have shown a result. This reasoning fails to recognize the heart of the matter. The purpose of the decision is precisely to give the Soviet Union an incentive for that negotiation. The condition that there must be a result first, defeats its own fulfillment. It is a prescription for doing nothing. What negotiations are we really going to conduct: those with the Soviet Union about armament control or those with the allies about as insignificant as possible a Dutch contribution to the joint effort?

Leading Dutch politicians have repeatedly taken a position in the past which indicates a sense of reality. Thus Lubbers recognized the political need to station cruise missiles in the Netherlands: "both to show the Soviets the alliance's solidarity and to avoid leaving the nuclear mess to others." (TROUW, 30 Jan 1981).

Pressure of Action Groups

Likewise the present minister of foreign affairs, Van der Stoel, declared in December 1979 in the Second Chamber, that if there still would be no results in weapons control negotiations at the end of 1981 and the SS-20 arsenal would be expanded, "the Netherlands must be ready to allow the stationing of a limited number of new weapons on its territory." Two years ago Van Mierlo said--I know it, he was still not minister--that we had to make our readiness for stationing clear "at the beginning of the negotiations process" (report of the Advisory Board for Defense Affairs).

What has caused these politicians to change their opinions? It cannot be otherwise, but the cause must be sought in the increasing pressure which action groups are exercising on them to oppose the use and possession of nuclear weapons. Although nothing indicates that we are on the eve of a military conflict, the concern about nuclear weapons is completely understandable. Likewise action groups

have no monopoly on concern. Nor do those who demonstrated on 21 November in Amsterdam have a monopoly on love of peace. It is the politicians who at the crossroad of domestic concern and foreign responsibilities, remembering the lessons of history, must develop and defend a long term policy. Moreover they must not follow, but lead. Therefore the VVD is not an action party but a policy party.

Earlier this year the Groningen professor of constitutional law, Prof Dr A. M. Donner, said that governing is not looking ahead, but waiting: until the support is created which makes needs negotiable and the solutions unavoidable. However, he then overlooks the responsibility of the politician to contribute to the development of that support. Governing is looking ahead. Idealism is necessary for that, but practicality, just as well. Emotion is no substitute for knowledge of affairs; conscience cannot do it without common sense. It is not reasonable to prescribe conditions which defeat their own fulfillment. It is shortsighted to give in to distorted emotions for unsound reasons and thus damage the alliance which guarantees our freedom. Therefore it is regrettable that we have not kept our promise of 2 years ago.

8490 CS0: 3105/62 ENERGY ECONOMICS GREECE

EEC FUNDING FOR TWO SOLAR ENERGY STATIONS

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 12 Dec 81 p 7

/Text/ Brussels (APE) -- The final studies on the solar energy stations in Kythnos and Agia Roumeli, Crete, have been successfully presented to the relevant EEC committee. The stations are to use photovoltaic conversion systems to be funded by the EEC. Representing the Greek side was Mr Hatzivasileiadis, DEI /Public Power Corporation/ electrical engineer. The Kythnos solar station will be built in cooperation with the DEI and Siemens and Varta of West Germany. Expenditures are estimated at 125 million drachmas. The project will be financed by the EEC, the German ministry of research and technology and Siemens.

The Agia Roumeli station will be self-contained and will supply electric power to the Agia Roumeli community. It will be built in cooperation with the DEI, the French SERI /Industrial Studies and Research Company/ and the West German Varta. Expenditures will amount to 68 million drachmas. The project will be financed by the EEC, the French Solar Energy Committee, the SERI and Varta.

5671

CSO: 4621/97

ENERGY ECONOMICS GREECE

TRADE, ENERGY AGREEMENTS SIGNED WITH ALBANIA

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 17 Dec 81 p 2

/Text/ The Albanian Government is interested in developing and expanding its general relations with Greece, beyond promoting cooperation in the economic field.

This interest of the Albanian Covernment was expressed in a memorandum by Mehmet Shehu, premier of that country, to Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou. This interest was also expressed to Greek Minister of Commerce N. Akritidis who headed a Greek delegation to Albania to sign a new trade agreement between the two countries for 1982.

Mr Akritidis stated that during his stay in Albania, two agreements were signed, one involving trade and the other energy.

The trade agreement which consists of the framework for trade relations between the two countries for 1982 is accompanied by two tables showing what products Greece will export to Albania and those that it will import. The agreement concerns mainly those Greek industrial products in which Albania is interested and those Albanian products, such as liquid fuel, asphalt, electric power, etc., in which Greece is interested.

Mr Akritidis stated that trade relations between the two countries have been developing in a satisfactory manner over the past few years and that they could be developed even more if certain problems were to be settled.

It should be noted that whereas in 1974 trade between the two countries amounted to 3 million dollars, in 1980 it reached the figure of 20 million dollars, and it is expected that this year the amount will be slightly lower than last year. Trade between the two countries is expected to double in 1982.

The energy agreement provides for the linking of Greece and Albania by a second power line capable of supplying Greece with electric power. Specifically, Albania can, during a first phase, sell us 1 billion kilowatt hours, whereas today Albania supplies us with up to 150 million kilowatt hours.

The linking of the power nets of the two countries will be completed in 30 months. In the meantime, the Albanian government is willing to supply Greece at once with 300 million kilowatt hours so long as Yugoslavia agrees, through whose net we

receive the electric power.

The DEI $/\overline{P}ublic$ Power Corporation/ and the ministry of industry will begin negotiations with the Yugoslav Government on this issue.

Subsequently, Mr Akritidis said that there was a problem in communications between the two countries because the two entrances are not open at present, i.e. Kakavia from Ioannina and Krystallopigi from Florina.

The Albanian officials asked that, as a first measure, the Krystallopigi entrance be opened, while the Greek side wants both opened for free communications.

These proposals will be discussed between the government of the two countries.

Finally, the Albanian Government expressed its interest in having the once a week Olymic Airways flight between Athens and Tirana increased to twice a week.

The minister of commerce pointed out that this was the first time that an Albanian premier had received a Greek delegation. This was interpreted as an intention and desire of the Albanian Government for further strengthening and expansion of general relations of the two countries.

Accompanying Mr Akritidis to Albania were El. Kiosklis and D. Polykhronopoulos, secretaries general of the ministry of commerce and industry respectively, as well as other service personnel.

5671

CSO: 4621/97

IMPORTS, TRADE WITH WEST AFRICA UPDATED IN REVIEW

London WEST AFRICA in English 30 Nov 81 pp 2843-2845

[Text]

FRENCH IMPORTS of Nigerian oil account for half of the West African contribution to France's imports from Africa. The region is also the most important contributor in the continent representing 45.1 per cent of France's imports in 1980 of African origin.

Before entering into more detailed analysis of French West African trade, a little more perspective is necessary. Africa occupies 11 per cent of France's total trade. After the heights of 1978 when France's trade with Africa reached its best balance, there was a slight decline in 1979 before rising again by nine per cent in 1980 showing a 13.4 billion franc credit balance. The improvement reflects the increase in the French credit with the francophone countries of Africa, which rose in the same period by 18.6 per cent to almost 14 billion francs

It is this quite unusual association with the former colonies which accounts for the strength of France's position in Africa. There was a 7.6 billion franc credit with the North African states of Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco (considered for technical purposes as part of Francophone Africa) and a credit of 3.95 billion with the West African francophone states. The amount traded with Central Africa is more modest but nevertheless showed vet another favourable balance of almost 1.3 billion francs.

The outstanding countries in sub-Saharan Africa are significant. By far the largest partner was Ivory Coast where there was a favourable balance of some 1.5 billion francs last year. This was a marked increase on 1979 caused by the drop in Ivorian cocoa sales. Although Senegal ranks second among West African Francophone states, the case of Niger with which there has been a growing deficit fits in with an overall pattern that has developed in French and sub-Saharan trade in which relations with countries producing strategic minerals have developed. Niger supplies uranium and as a consequence there has been a marked increase in the trade balance favourable to Niger.

In Central Africa, Gabon has emerged as an increasingly important trading partner — a reflection of the close links that developed between former President Giscard d'Estaing's government and President Bongo. Dominated by oil and timber, Gabon's exports to France reached some 2.7 billion francs in 1980 and constituted 11 per cent of total francophone exports to France. Zaire is France's main supplier of copper.

French purchases of Guinean bauxite account for 72 per cent of total bauxite imports of France, though France has recently reduced its Guinean imports because of world prices.

France's trading position was transformed during 1980 by a 62 per cent rise in the cost of energy. Nigeria, after Saudi Arabia and Iraq, sold 10.9m. tonnes worth 12.2 billion francs to France during the year, and as such overshadowed many of the French considerations about trade with West Africa.

France's "largest trading partner"

Of the non-francophone West African countries, Nigeria is, by far, the largest trading partner of France. Of a total of 13.4 billion francs worth of imports from the regions, last year, 12.7 came from Nigeria. The rise of the cost of oil was largely responsible for the dramatic increase from 1979 when French imports from Nigeria were worth 6.4 million francs. In 1979 10m. tonnes of Nigerian oil were imported in France, while in 1980 this rose slightly to 10.9m. tonnes.

Trading with Liberia, the second most important non-francophone state in West Africa to trade with France, was seriously disrupted in 1980 when a certain degree of disorganisation reigned in the economy after the coup that overthrew William Tolbert. While French imports of Liberian iron rose from 458.7m. francs to 528m.

francs, exports to Liberia fell by some 35 per cent from 535m. francs to 330.9m. francs.

As the figures in the table indicate, there were significant increases in the quantity trade with The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone and Ghana. In each case France came off the better, though the overall picture is reversed when Nigerian oil imports are taken into account.

While France enjoys a favourable trade

balance with the West and Central African states of Africa, it is clear that certain significant features stand out: the over-whelming role played by Nigerian oil; the growing contact with the states of Central Africa which hold rich deposits of minerals which account for a large part of French supplies; and the knowledge that in Nigeria and other Francophone countries there exists a large and untapped market for French goods.

The ports that serve West Africa

French ports have a long tradition of trade with West Africa. In this article, a correspondent examines the role of

FRENCH TRADE WITH AFRICA (millions of French francs)

	im	ports	ΘX	ports
	1979	1980	1979	1980
North Africa	12.180	16.023	23.876	38.994
West Africa	13.538	20.220	13.302	17.096
Central Africa	4.419	5.482	5.407	6.739
East Africa	1.687	1.681	1.091	1.627
Southern Africa				
(without S. Africa)	16	209	6	98
TOTAL	32.546	44.839	44.836	58.197
of which:				
Francophone Africa	20.771	25 .357	32.555	39.330
non-Francophone				
West Africa	6.954	13.421	4.000	6.343
oil	13.190	22.005	_	_

FRENCH TRADE WITH NON-FRANCOPHONE WEST AFRICA (millions of French francs)

	in	nports	93	kports .
	1979	1980	1979	1980
The Gambia	29.9	28.8	39.1	51.5
Guinea-Bissau	2.3	18.9	23.2	38.5
Sierra Leone	15.8	19.4	80.2	95.5
Libena	458.7	528.2	535.8	330.9
Ghana	65.7	96.7	77.4	111.2
Nigeria	6,382.3	12,729.5	3,245.0	5,715.0
TOTAL	6,954.7	13,421.5	4,000.7	6,343.4

the ports of Le Havre, Marseilles and the fast developing Rouen in the commercial relations between France and Africa.

THE MAIN products moving up and down the West African coast are oil, iron ore, cereals, phosphates, bauxites and other metals. Three French ports dominate Franco-African trade; Le Havre, Marseilles and Rouen.

Le Havre is the most important for trade with West Africa, despite the relative decline in French imports of oil due to the French economic recession. Total bulk turnover at the port in 1980 was 79m. tonnes. Twelve new routes to West Africa were started in 1980. In the same year. Nigeria exported nearly four million tonnes of crude oil via Le Havre (a 2½ per cent increase on 1979). Other Nigerian exports via Le Havre were insignificant by comparison. Gabon exported 630,000 tonnes of crude oil via Le Havre and again, other Gabonese exports were very small by comparison.

The container revolution has meant that this form of packing now represents 59 per cent of all traffic through Le Havre, by far the highest proportion of any French port. In fact, Le Havre sees more containers pass through in a year than all of the other

French ports together.

Apart from oil from Lagos and Libreville, Abidjan and San Pedro in the Ivory Coast are the main trading "partners" with Le Havre. The special Africa Wharf sees 30 regular arrivals every month. Coffee is the main imported product after oil; 21,000 tonnes arrived in 1980 from the Ivory Coast. Le Havre has traditional links with the coffee market; there are processing and storage facilities close by, as well as an established futures market between Le Havre and London. Cotton was the second most important import from the Ivory Coast in 1980, by bulk, followed by cocoa which dropped because of the Ivorian cocoa boycott and then rubber

Le Havre is the most important

Cameroon's trade with Le Havre increased in 1980, mainly because oil was landed for the first time. Other, traditional, exports such as coffee and fresh fruits fell against 1979 figures (minus 17.3 per cent and minus 51.5 per cent respectively).

In the other direction, to West Africa, went mainly cereals and manufactures. Ivory Coast was the primary recipient of French cereals in 1980, importing 180,000 tonnes. Then came Senegal (73,000 tonnes), Nigeria and Cameroon. Nigeria's other main imports from Le Havre were refined oil products, mainly lubricants.

Apart from processing physical imports and exports, the Le Havre Port Authorities have established consultancy services used by the Liberian, Cameroonian and Ivorian governments. There is a port management training school, where about half of the students come from overseas, two thirds of whom are from Francophone Africa. There are plans to diversify further from oil specialisation (58m. out of the 79m. tonnes handled in 1980) by building improved floating docks and expanding cereal processing facilities. Some of the ship repairing and maintenance business has gone to West African ports themselves. At Dakar-Marine, a Norwegian-financed dry dock can take ships of up to 60,000 tonnes.

Marseilles traditionally serves the North African market, but traffic with West Africa is increasing. Total bulk turnaround for 1980 was 104m. tonnes. Total traffic with Nigeria doubled between 1979 and 1980. Oil imports accounted for most of this increase, sugar exports having fallen during that period. Nigeria supplied 10.5m. tonnes of crude oil via Marseilles in 1980, Gabon 1.6m. tonnes. Facilities for handling liquefied natural gas are planned, and this could lead to increased trade with Nigeria (if the Bonny plant takes off) in the future. Marseilles is more important than Le Havre as a passenger port, although the bulk of travel is with North Africa. It is cheaper and faster to travel to Europe by plane from West Africa, except in the lowest class accommodation.

Rouen, Le Havre's neighbour, 75 miles inland on the Seine, is the fastest growing of all the French ports, although it is only fourth in terms of traffic tonnage. Oil is not an important factor as with the other ports; it only represents 3 per cent of total traffic. Cereal exports dominate, Rouen being closer to Paris and the rich agricultural north-west of France. The list of West African countries using the port includes: Togo (12th with 390,000 tonnes of traffic in 1980 — the same as in 1979), Nigeria (16th

with 284,000 tonnes, plus 105 per cent), Ivory Coast (19th with 228,000 tonnes, minus 4 per cent), Senegal (22nd with 178,000 tonnes, minus 12 per cent) and Cameroon (25th with 174,000 tonnes, the same as 1979). Overall, trade with West Africa increased against 1979 by 12 per cent and fell with Africa as a whole by 10 per cent. Rouen took over some of the Nigerian sugar import trade from Marseilles in 1980, increasing that particular trade by 17 per cent on 1979.

Containerisation has become increasingly important between Rouen and West Africa in general and Nigeria in particular. Rouen was chosen by Peugeot as the departure point for components being sent to the assembly plant at Kaduna (once the airlift to Kano ceased). Containerised traffic between Rouen and Lagos increased by a staggering 555 per cent between 1979 and

a staggering 555 per cent between 1979 and 1980, as a result. Total containerised traffic between Rouen and West Africa increased by 80 per cent for the same period. Also in 1980, new routes to Dakar. Banjul, Conakry and Cotonou were established.

Prospects for a healthy future

Overall, the percentage of shipping trade with West Africa taken by French lines has declined as developing countries insist on a slice of the difference between "c.i.f." and "f.o.b.". But the large liner conferences still dominate the traditional routes. Despite the general decline in French oil imports, it seems likely, given that the eighties are set to be the decade of oil in West Africa, (from Dakar to Luanda there is prospecting and drilling of one kind or another under way), that traffic will increase between West Africa and the French ports. The gradual breaking down of the traditional Francophone/ Anglophone barriers could also lead to an increase in traffic, though this depends, of course, on how quick the Port Authorities in London and Southampton are to take up the challenge of trading with Daker, San Pedro and elsewhere. But if past efforts are anything to go by, French exporters are likely to be more aggressive than their British counterparts.

CSO: 3120/30

ECONOMIC

BRIEFS

MERCHANT FLEET SIZE INCREASES .- The size of the Norwegian merchant fleet increased in the course of the year by a good million tons. It is the first time there has been an increase in the tonnage since the shipping crisis set in. The fleet engaged in foreign trade is now up to a good 38 million tons, it was announced by shipowner Fridtjof Lorentzen at a press conference at the Norwegian Shipping Association Thursday [3 December 1981]. It was pointed out at the press conference that no increase in the Norwegian tonnage is to be expected. The Norwegian overseas fleet is in the midst of a structural change that involves an increasing number of smaller ships. Norwegian shipyards now have 167 ships on order with a total of 4.2 million tons' capacity, or 10 percent of the total fleet. That means that the contracts on hand have increased in number of ships, but dropped in tonnage in the course of the year. There has been an especially great increase in contracts for supply ships and servicing vessels for oil operations. There are now 59 such vessels on order. The value of the vessels on order is about 20 billion kroner. The gross foreign exchange earnings of the shipping industry for 1981 are estimated at 30 billion kroner as against 27 billion for 1980. The net foreign exchange brought in, however, is expected to increase only slightly, from 11 billion to 11.5 billion kroner. Vessels for the offshore industry alone account for orders amounting to 6 billion kroner. The gross income for 1981 is estimated at ca. 3 billion, which is a 1-billion increase over last year. [Text] [Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 4 Dec 81 p 12] 8815

CSO: 3108/26

POLITICAL BELGIUM

EXPERT VIEWS PROBLEMS OF REGIONALIZATION

Brussels LE SOIR in French 7 Dec 81 p 2

Report on interview with Francis Delperee, professor of constitutional law at the Catholic University of Louvain, by Guy Duplat: "The Regional Executive Bodies a Fortnight from Now: What To Do with Ministers Dehousse, Hansenne, Busquin"; date and place of interview not given

[Text] On 22 and 23 December next, the reform of the Belgian state will enter a very important phase. The community and regional councils will meet and should immediately elect their executive bodies. They will be real governments of the communities and of the regions, independent of the central government. A major innovation which has more than one politician worried.

How will coexistence between these regional governments and the central government go? While there is still no court of arbitration to settle the inevitable conflicts of authority? While no regional or community government has been established yet? While the central government will very likely still be in the middle of a political crisis? The prime minister has already sent out a warning: "The state reform must take place in the spirit of the laws which have been passed and not illegally, because we reject the Balkanization of the country." This week, a ministerial committee of institutional reform will study the problems which will arise in the upcoming weeks as a result of this point of no return in the state reform.

In this respect, we interviewed Mr Francis Delperee, professor of constitutional law at the ULC [Catholic University of Louvain], a well known expert on all these questions.

Unless a Miracle

[Question] What constitutional difficulties should we expect in the near future?

[Answer] First of all, there is a problem of time. Nobody imagines that the national government will be established the same day and at the same hour as the community and regional executive bodies. And then, it must be one thing or the other.

Either -- miracle! -- the government is set up in a very short period of time, let us say around 15 December, and the executive bodies will be set up only on 22 or 23 December at the earliest. What should be done in the meantime then? What should be done with the temporary executive bodies of the Eyskens administration? Just when the whole team will disappear, and even though the color of the coalition may change, it will be necessary to maintain the working of these executive bodies for a week. With, for example, Mr Dehousse participating in a social-Christian-liberal council of ministers!

Or else -- and this second scenario would seem more probable -- the executive bodies are set up before Christmas and the government itself only comes out of its long delivery process during the first weeks of 1982. A new gap is produced. Legally it does not raise any particular difficulties. The problem is more psychological than legal. But what would one think of a state which has nothing better to offer in dealing with a full fledged and fully legitimate community and regional government than a provisional administration. (Editor's note: Numerous political milieux are afraid that these community and regional governments would then vote resolutions demanding greater powers and means.)

[Question] In the latter case there will also be problems of personnel, won't there?

[Answer] One must, indeed, keep a few personnel problems in mind. I want to be very concrete. Hence, I will take three examples.

Today, Jean-Maurice Dehousse is a minister, a member of the Walloon regional executive body and even its president. Everything would lead one to believe that on 23 December he will find a place in the 6 member Walloon executive body, in which 3 seats are reserved for the PS [Socialist Party (Walloon)]. But this appointment would obviously be subordinated to the king's acceptance, on 23 December, of Mr Dehousse's resignation of his ministerial functions. To reason differently would mean to organize a telescoping of the temporary executive bodies and the autonomous executive bodies.

Michel Hansenne, on the other hand, is a minister, a member of the executive body of the French community and its president. In no way will he be able to keep his positions in the new community executive body, because the PSC [Social Christian Party (Walloon)] did not obtain any of the three positions at stake. So, on 22 December, he will have to pass the community torch on to a successor. Will he for all that disappear from the government scene? Nothing is certain in this respect. In the concern for maintaining certain political balances, even within an outgoing administration, it might be suggested that Mr Hansenne be kept on as a minister without portfolio until the crisis has been resolved.

Outgoing? Acting

Philippe Busquin is minister of interior and minister of national education. As minister of national education he is a member of the executive body of the French community. Perhaps he will be able to keep his community positions, as the PS holds two out of three seats in the new executive body. In order to hold them, he will give up his ministerial functions. But all of them or only a few of them?

Could he, at one and the same time, cumulate the responsibilities of minister of the interior and those of a member of the autonomous French executive body?

The law clearly states that "nobody can be simultaneously a member of an executive body and a member of the national government." But it is very likely that on 22 December there will not yet be a national government in the strict sense of the word. Thus, the letter of the law allows this kind of cumulation for a few days more. But the spirit of the law was undoubtedly different. It would be better if, at the time when the community and the region begin to bloom, their political leaders as a whole resign all their other ministerial functions and are replaced by acting officials within the outgoing government.

[Question] What precautions should be taken?

[Answer] A word of advice: see to it, under all circumstances and in every point, that respect for the rule of parity in the outgoing ministry is maintained. The departure of some or the transfer of others c unot excuse the slightest breach of this basic rule of organization and functioni. of our public institutions. (Editor's note: It is known that the CVP [Social cistian Party (Flemish)] believed that the rule of parity does not necessarily a ry to an outgoing administration.)

A wish also: to see the same rule of parity being respected in the future central government, in such a way that the two large communities which constitute Belgium are legitimately represented in it, according to the prescriptions of the constitution. (Editor's note: As far as Mr Delperee is concerned, in spite of the existence of regional and community governments, the future central government should still have a majority in both communities.)

8463 CSO: 3100/175 POLITICAL

SPOKESMAN FOR ECOLOGIST PARTY ON GOALS

Brussels LE SOIR in French 12/13 Dec 81 pp 1, 2

[Commentary by Mark Dubrulle, executive committee member of AGALEV (Live Differently): "The Bicycle of the Ecologists"]

[Text] It is not enough to enter parliament on a bicycle. The playful gesture of the elected ecologists pedaling to their induction was aimed at more than the photographers' cameras. It was to be a symbol of the philosophy of the ecologists: to direct greater attention to the weak and the marginals in society as well as in traffic, and to search for alternatives in a more radical approach to the major problems of the day. Innovation in government; also equity.

While the big traditional parties are getting bogged lown in the crisis by obstinately insisting on the application of outdated recipes -- the very same ones which provoked the crisis --, the ecologists are proposing a new approach, a new vision.

The fiasco of a society of industrial growth is obvious. To observe this is easy. To find worthwhile alternatives is less so. This requires a sincere self-examination, an honest assessment and the courage to take risks.

But we are so pampered, so protected from responsibility and so demotivated that we expect miracle solutions, presented on a silver platter by brilliant ministers, doctors of philosophy in economics or in law.

The ecologist alternative is not that return to the bicycle and the oxcart. The old times were not necessarily "good"; nature not always idyllic. The ecologist alternative is a new perspective, another way of life and thus another way to produce, to consume... and to govern.

The axes of the ecologist policy are clear: a refined democracy and a "green" economy.

For the ecologists, parliamentary democracy remains the least bad of the systems. It is certainly perfectible and should be refined. To snatch power away from the mysteries of the parties and pressure groups to return it to the citizens implies a voluntarist policy of opening up and transparency. The ecologists, who are not afraid to open up their own committee meetings, will fight for a similar transparency at the level of parliament, and of the provincial and municipal councils. They will fight any form of limited democracy, of hidden power: /intermunicipal

organizations/ [in italics], state owned companies and non-profit municipal organizations, in which non-elected political personalities sit and carve out a good measure of power for themselves, which is hard to control.

Following the same logic, any form of concentration of power and of the concurrent holding of public mandates would be banned.

Transparency also requires dynamic means of communication, adapted to our times. In this respect, the spectacular breakthrough of free radio stations undoubtedly offers us new perspectives. Local television networks could broadcast municipal council debates. The public benches in our city halls are far too empty.

Our members of parliament will also fight for the recognition of any significant popular initiative (neighborhood committees, action groups, etcetera).

Finally, democracy demands the abolition of the nation state, centralizing in the extreme, and the establishment of a truly federalist state. Clusters of municipalities will not be merged, but will become federated to form sub-regions, provinces, in effect regions of which the human, economic and ecological potentials are sufficient to make them viable. These regions would get together, always in a spirit of friendship and solidarity, within a federation, today Belgian, tomorrow European.

As for the green economy, it is not only an economy which is more concerned about nature, our resources and our heritage, it is first of all a new approach to the production of material goods. It is, in fact, at this level that the ecologist movement takes its real significance and its historic meaning.

To the traditional issue which opposes liberalism and collectivism, specifically /who/ [in italics] controls the means of production, the ecologists have added two others: /what/ [in italics] should be produced? And /how/ [in italics] should one produce in order not to endanger our survival and that of our planet?

The priority among all priorities, in Belgium as well as in 150 other countries in the world, is to increase production, whatever the social, energy or ecological costs involved. All other objectives are subordinated to this.

Now, the facts clearly demonstrate that the growth of material production and of consumption go hand in hand with a reduction of natural resources, including air, water, land, flora and fauna, elements which are essential to the survival of man.

While it is clearly evident that it is better to be rich and in good health than poor and ill, it has not been proven that the increase of material goods -- at the level of the gross national product -- ipso factor generates well-being, health, even happiness. Far from it! Unemployment, the so-called "civilization" illnesses and the destruction of nature are the result of economic options which still prevail today.

Among their priorities, the ecologists advocate an increase in sensitivity, respectful of men and of their environment:

- the creation of quality jobs in enterprises which are decentralized and selfmanaged to the extent possible; - an equitable distribution of labor among men and women, young and old;

- an overall energy policy centered around energy conservation, increased productivity of equipment, and a diversification of energy sources -- of course, without new nuclear power stations;

- better regional planning and planning of work time, a deconcentration of ser-

vices, priority to "light" public transporation;

- an agriculture which is more diversified and less geared to industry through a subsidy to the farmer rather than to the product;

- a substantial reduction of the large infrastructure projects, the cost/benefit analysis of which rarely demonstrates a real benefit to the majority of the population;

- creation of jobs in new sectors such as the protection of nature and of the cultural heritage, improvement of the environment, and socio-cultural activation in the widest sense of the word.

In addition to these economic options, the ecologists -- henceforth co-responsible for our country's policy -- will fight for a reduction in disparities in income, for a forthcoming attitude concerning disarmament and for greater solidarity with the Third World, to which we should no longer export our outdated models of industrial growth but rather our creativity and our technical nature, in order to develop new production models there which are self-managed and to the benefit of the masses.

This sketch -- which is actually too brief -- proves that the ecologists have an approach different from the one readily attributed to them by their adversaries. It is not a question of a romantic return to nature, candles and the bicycle. Even though in their society there will be room for bicycles. After all, to go to parliament or to the office on a bicycle, nearly strolling, isn't this the real luxury, the quality of life for which we are currently killing ourselves at work?

8463

CSO: 3100/174

POLITICAL FRANCE

FORMER 'L'EXPRESS' EDITOR ON SOCIALISM, NATIONALIZATIONS

Paris LE POINT in French 16 Nov 81 pp 64-65

[Interview with Jean-Francois Revel, former editor of L'EXPRESS, by Claude Imbert and Jacques Duquesne; date and place not specified]

[Text] "The Grace of the State." Under that title, Jean-Francois Revel--essayist and former editor of L'EXPRESS--has published a sizzling Voltairian pamphlet (Grasset Publishing House) against the Socialist government. It is a pamphlet that will revive the French political debate. Here he explains himself to Claude Imbert and Jacques Duquesne.

LE POINT: In your book, you treat socialism as a phenomenon of belief.

Jean-Francois Revel: That's what it is: a phenomenon of belief. More precisely, it is an ideology, and an ideology is belief translated into acts. It is also a system for interpreting reality in such a way that the facts can never under any circumstances prove it wrong. It is believed that a man once walked on water. Try it yourself, and you will drown. But your drowning will not convince the ideologist: he will suggest that your drowning was due to sabotage, but that one can—he believes it—walk on water.

Question: You say that the failure of the various socialist systems has not led their supporters to wonder whether the worm might be in the fruit of the system itself. Since their belief is that the system is good, they conclude that if its fruit is overripe, all one has to do is improve the system.

Revel: Or apply it more thoroughly. Every time that a socialist system--whether totalitarian or moderate--experiences failure, the Socialists find external explanations for that failure, and the first explanation, of course, is that it had enemies! Big discovery! That is the fate of all systems! No normal politician is going to tell you: "My enemies did not support me. That is why I failed." But the Socialists will say it. That was already a striking feature of their explanation of Allende's failure. Very logically, they should apply that strange reasoning to capitalism. But the Socialists, very legitimately, judge capitalism by its acts. They would not allow a supporter of the capitalist system to tell them: "Wait a while. I forbid you to judge capitalism on what has happened to date. I will be judged only on the capitalism which I am in the process of developing and which does not yet exist."

Question: How do you explain the fact that the French left has espoused that ideological vision rather than the pragmatism of social democracy?

Revel: Social democracy has never really been accepted in France. The writings of Blum or Jaures preach a nationalization of the economy. Quite simply, Blum claimed that it was necessary to act by stages because one cannot transform a society without having at least two-thirds or three-fourths of public opinion behind one.

In addition, we in this country have witnessed a re-Marxicizing of the noncommunist left over the past 10 years. That is strange, of course, because Marxism is discredited at the highest level, and the great intellectuals are turning away from it. But the wave is now affecting the lower clergy, if I may put it that way. It is striking to see that secondary and even primary education are heavily permeated with Marxism. The teaching of history and economics, for example, is often based on a condemnation of profit, private enterprise, capitalism, and so on. It is somewhat as though waves of intransigent Marxism from the days when many intellectuals supported it had belatedly reached a vast intellectual third estate, long after the "radio waves" were first transmitted. And it is happening at the very moment when Poland is collapsing, Afghanistan is being invaded, and we are learning astonishing facts every day about the decay of the Soviet economy and the reduction to beggary of daily life in the USSR. Those most captivated by this Marxist wave are the teachers. I have nothing against teachers, since I was one for nearly 18 years. But precisely because I was a teacher, I can say that there are few professions more cut off from economic realities than the teaching profession.

Question: You yourself occupied various responsible posts in Francois Mitterrand's Federation of the Left in the 1960's. Can you explain how you came to change your opinions?

Revel: Easily. I was quite allergic to Gaullism and the Gaullist personalizing of power. Somewhat for the same reasons, incidentally, as those causing a problem in the current situation: I felt that the executive branch was too strong—that there was a sort of invasion or permeation of society by the government. Of course, I realized that the constitution and the election law had been constructed in reaction to the errors of the Fourth Republic. But we had gone so far in the opposite direction that—just as is happening today—we were reaching the closest possible proximity to a single-party system that was still compatible with democracy. Of course, we have retained the democratic source of power—that is, elections. The thing is that democracy is not only a matter of being elected: it is also a matter of what one does after being elected. And in France, we have a government power that is conferred democratically, but one that could be exercised undemocratically after that point. It is bad to have a political system in which the opposition has no influence on collective life and can only hope for the "wonderful [election] night" 25 years from now when it will sweep away the others and again turn the situation around.

In the 1960's, therefore, it seemed to me that Francois Mitterrand was presenting that problem very well. And he became the head of a movement constituting the union of the noncommunist left. I felt comfortable with that. Of course, it was realized that the noncommunist left would have to reach certain electoral agreements with the Communists. It happened, unfortunately, that the Common Program soon drifted farther left—too far. Besides, I observed at the time of the Epinay congress that the

Socialist Party had been permeated by the most simplistic Marxist doctrines. And lastly, there was ignorance of the real mechanisms of contemporary societies—the archaism, in short, of Socialist political thinking, to use Rocard's expression. So I left.

Question: Did you discuss the matter with Francois Mitterrand?

Revel: Several times. I recall, for example, a dinner—it was in 1972—where we talked about nationalizations. I told him first that nationalizations are not a specific mark of the left. Franco was the greatest "nationalizer" Spain has ever nad. I added: "Why be so eager to nationalize when the real problem now is the multinationals?" He immediately answered: "How can we stamp them out?" And I retorted: "But why do you want to stamp them out just like that? Maybe that is where progress lies." I recall telling him that in the 14th or 15th century, more progress probably resulted from the Florentine bankers or Venice's maritime trading companies than from any type of seigniorial ownership or monarchies of the French type, and so on. The multinationals may be of value, even for the Third World; at least the question deserves study. But I felt a lack of intellectual interest in the matter. For him, good and evil were simply there: he regarded capitalism as very bad when it was national and even worse when it was multinational, and that was the end of it.

Question: In your book, you state your opinion that with the current policy--more especially as regards nationalizations--the social democratic path is in the process of being abandoned. Do you rule out corrective measures or a retreat?

Revel: The nationalization program makes no sense unless it is a stage--unless it is a preparation for bringing almost the entire economy under government control. As a matter of fact, one finds in official writings by the PS [Socialist Party] and Francois Mitterrand the idea that the current program is only a "transition to socialism." Even if the second stage of the transition is a long way off, it is obvious that the very certainty, or the very great probability, that it is coming can only paralyze private entrepreneurs. That is what we are witnessing now. You cannot hand out lumps of sugar to them and say "You are very nice. Bravo," and tell them at the same time: "If we are asking you to make an effort now, it is only to help us eliminate you later."

Question: If French socialism is more radical than many other forms of Western socialism, is that not also due to the special characteristics of French capitalism? Isn't it getting the socialism it deserves?

Revel: That is true. France has always been the country of the planned economy-of state control. French capitalists have always wanted to be protected. It is really only the most recent generation of French managers who have acquired an international mentality and gotten in tune with the ideas of the big foreign companies—who have learned the rudiments of management and accepted competition. That being said, capitalism—despite the dishonesty of certain capitalists, despite the incompetence of certain company heads, despite the corruption of a few managers, despite the cases of shady collusion with the political world, and despite the waste and the investment mistakes—has, when you get down to it, provided its people with a good living. Better, in any case, than the socialist systems have, and merely from the

standpoint of the facts and figures measuring living standards--here we are not even talking about freedoms.

The fact is that despite everything, capitalism contains a little formula for keeping the economic wheels turning. But socialism, in the countries where it has existed, has demonstrated the opposite. At least if we define socialism as the reduction of the private sector and the expansion of the public sector. And if we don't define it that way, then I don't know what it is.

11798

CSO: 3100/140

POLITICAL FRANCE

CGT SECRETARY WARCHOLAK ON UNIONIZATION CAMPAIGN

Paris L'HUMANITE in French 24 Nov 81 p 8

[Interview with Michel Warcholak, secretary of the General Confederation of Labor; date and place not specified]

[Text] The CGT decided this year to kick off its campaign for the renewal of membership cards by creating a public event that is national in scope, since it has scheduled a meeting with union members from the 900 largest French firms that will be held in Nanterre on 3 and 4 December 1981. We asked Michel Warcholak, secretary of the CGT, to explain the purpose of that meeting to us.

Michel Warcholak: This is quite an exceptional initiative, not only because of the number of firms involved, but also because of their diverse situations as public, private, and nationalized firms, and above all because the objective is to kick off the campaign for 1982 membership cards in this new situation. For various reasons, the state of our organized forces is not satisfactory. We are aware of the reasons. What matters today is that we get a complete picture of what we can expect to achieve, think big, and act accordingly.

What this means is that the renewal of cards for 1982 is being undertaken with a new dynamism and conquering spirit that are in keeping with the possibilities and the stakes. Insuring a massive and public response to unionization—to the normal and natural act of being a CGT union member—is our objective in the service of the struggle.

The CGT has millions of members. It is a real force, but its power could be increased tenfold with strong, well-established, democratic, and active unions in every firm, because that is where the stakes are.

The CGT has resolutely designed its action for the success of the change. Its authority and its ability to make proposals—and to protest—give its activities special weight, notably in the big firms, where hundreds of thousands of workers rub elbows every day, discuss the situation, and evaluate and judge what is being done and what should be done. The organized influence and strength at our disposal are therefore of prime importance.

Best Conditions

[Question] Are preparations for this meeting the business of officials responsible especially for organizational tasks, or is it up to the CGT organizations to promote action, debate, and mobilization among the workers in those big firms?

M.W.: It is both the role of the organization secretaries and the business of the entire union leadership. Developments in union action in recent years show that its effectiveness is heavily dependent on the quality of our organizational work.

There are many deficiencies to be corrected from that standpoint, and that commits all of us at every level. That is how we will create the best conditions for action, debate, and commitment among the workers.

A strong and active union is concerned about the number of members it has, its electoral influence, and the quality of its activity. Those are the special responsibilities of the organization secretaries, who should exist in every big firm. This is not a matter of taking a narrow view of the strengthening of the CGT; it is certainly a question of organization, but also one of a state of mind and of good sense. We can talk a long time and competently, but without organization—without union life and organized forces—we would be doomed to think small and act small.

But today we are in a position to establish ourselves in every sense of the term, immediately and rightfully, in the firms—the big firms—with a view to organizing a union life that is broad in scope, conquering, structured, and backed by worker participation.

It is indispensable to realize that, but it is also necessary to act accordingly, and the sooner the better.

Means of Change

[Question] Aren't you running the risk of giving the impression that you are not interested in the thousands of wage earners working in the PME [Small and Medium-Size Businesses], who are the least well paid and whose living conditions are the least favorable?

M.W.: We are attending to that, because the prime position of the big firms cannot blur the existence of thousands of small and medium-size firms employing nearly 6.5 million workers who are scattered widely in most professional branches and in most of the regions.

They, too, represent a force, even if our activity there is carried on under different conditions. As a matter of fact, a number of unions help in the work of the local unions and provide effective aid for establishing the CGT in the PME and "sponsoring" them. Those concentrated efforts will give an exceptional dimension to the issuing of union cards for 1982.

In fact, that will be the objective of the meeting by our 929 local unions on 14 and 15 January 1982, which will give new momentum to our initiatives.

[Question] As H. Krasucki recalled at the Press Club on Sunday evening, the CGT will have to engage in activity everywhere to remove the obstacles set up by the employers and build a union worthy of those ambitions.

M.W.: There is plenty to do! And there are not too many of us to face up to it. Quite the contrary. That is why we stick to the language of responsibility, not to repeat again everything we have suffered--really suffered--for years, but to get the measure of everything that has become possible. So we must get hold of ourselves to win on the issues of wages, purchasing power, working conditions, and freedoms. New areas are opening up to us with the expansion and democratization of the public and nationalized sector, the struggle against inflation by means of rigorous price controls at their point of formation, and on many other questions. Yes, we must be active everywhere, and that is just the opposite of a cozy withdrawal into ourselves. And without abandoning our sense of responsibility.

The employers vigorously oppose this, but that does not impress us. They cannot do whatever they want, as they could before, and that is what irritates them.

So! It is a matter of gathering strength in keeping with that situation and with our ambition to be the union of change.

11798

CSO: 3100/140

POLITICAL NORWAY

POLL MEASURES VOTER ATTITUDE ON PARTIES' ABILITY TO ACT

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 19 Nov 81 p 3

[Text] Confidence in the Conservative government under Kare Willoch's leadership is far greater than the confidence in a Labor Party government with Gro Harlem Brundtland as prime minister. In many fields the voters say that the new government is better fitted to solve problems than a Labor Party government would have been. That applies among other things to price increases, tax policy, security policy, school policy, the status of NRK [the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation], and the oil policy. A Harlem Brundtland government "wins" when it comes to employment and care of the aged, it appears from a poll taken for AFTENPOSTEN by Norwegian Opinion Institute.

The question asked by the NOI [Norwegian Opinion Institute] interviewers ran: "Do you have the greatest confidence in a Conservative government under Kåre Willoch or a Labor Party government under Gro Harlem Brundtland, or do you have equally great confidence in both or little in either of them with regard to price increases, tax levels, employment, school policy, care of the aged, public health, the status of the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation, oil operations, and secuity policy?"

With regard to prices the answers are distributed as follows:

	Total	Men	Women
Willoch Conservative government	38	40	37
Brundtland Labor Party government	22	23	21
Both	15	13	17
Neither	22	23	21
Do not know	3	1	4
Total	100	100	100

To the question about taxes people answered as follows:

	Total	Men	Women
Willoch Conservative government	54	55	52
Brundtland Labor Party government	21	22	21
Both	9	8	9
Neither	. 14	13	14
Do not know	_ 2	_1	3
Total	100	100	100

But Gro Harlem Brundtland can also note that people would rather have had her and a Labor Party government to tackle employment problems and give the country the best possible care of the aged.

Here are the percentages of answers, first on employment, then on care of the aged:

	Total	Men	Women
Willoch Conservative government	26	26	26
Brundtland Labor Party government	43	46	40
Both	17	16	18
Neither	9	9	9
Do not know	_ 5	3	_ 7
Total	100	100	100
	Total	Men	Women
Willoch Conservative government	29	27	30
Brundtland Labor Party government	34	35	33
Both	25	26	24
Neither	8	8	7
Do not know	_ 5	4	_ 6
Total	100	100	100

With regard to the health system the two possible governments are even. The incumbent Conservative government gets 30 percent, a Labor Party government 31 percent, while 26 percent have confidence in both. The Conservative government's majority is quite solid among voters of all non-socialist parties, while a Harlem Brundtland government's supporters are to be found in the Labor Party and the SV [the Socialist Left Party].

The school policy is a "parade ground" for the Willoch government, with a lead of 41 to 25 over a Labor Party government. Nineteen percent believe that school-policy problems would be solved equally well by both alternatives. On this question, too, naturally enough, there is strong confidence in a Conservative government in all of the non-socialist parties. The Liberal Party is much divided, while the Labor Party and SV sympathizers give their "votes" to Gro Harlem Brundtland.

Fifty-two percent express confidence in the Willoch government's handling of the NRK; only 26 percent trust most in Gro Harlem Brundtland in that connection. In this matter there is palpably greater confidence in the Willoch government within both the Labor Party and the SV than in other fields, even though Gro Harlem Brundtland still gets the greatest support in these two parties. But over a

fourth of the Labor Party sympathizers actually prefer a Conservative government's NRK policy.

The last two questions have to do with the oil operations and security policy, and the distribution of answers is shown in the following two tables:

	Age in Years Political							1 S	l Sympathy*				
	Total	Men	Women	<30	30-59	>60	Α	sv	FP	Н	KrF	S	V
Willoch													
Conservative government Brundtland	37	38	36	32	39	42	5	2	52	76	45	29	21
Labor Party government	26	30	23	26	27	24	58	50	6	3	11	15	8
Both	21	19	22	20	20	23	23	10	22	15	28	39	30
Neither	9	9	10	15	7	7	7	31	14	3	8	6	36
Do not know	6	4	9	_ 7		_4	7	7	6	3	9	12	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	Total	Men	Women	<30	30-59	≥60	Α	sv	FP	Н	KrF	S	v
Willoch													
Conservative gov't Brundtland	36	37	34	34	34	42	9	4	36	68	47	38	19
Labor Party government	25	28	23	25	25	26	57	45	9	4	5	11	15
Both	24	24	24	20	26	22	25	9	32	21	32	42	33
Neither	10	9	11	17	8	6	6	36	12	4	7	1	32
Do not know	5	2	8	4	6	5	5	6	11	_4	9	8	
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

^{*} Abbreviations for political parties:

8815

CSO: 3108/26

A Labor Party

SV Socialist Left Party

FP Progressive Party

H Conservative Party

KrF Christian People's Party

S Center Party

V Liberal Party

POLITICAL

GOVERNMENT FORCED TO INCREASE AID FUNDS BY STORTING

Unusual Bitter Fight on Issue

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 17 Nov 81 p 60

[Text] There will be changes in the foreign aid budget next year, some of them quite considerable, from what the Harlem Brundtland and Willoch governments had planned. To some extent the Conservative Party also favors increasing a number of budget items, with the agreement of Foreign Minister Svenn Stray. There has rarely been such a big fight over appropriations for aid to so many underdeveloped countries as this year. The Storting will have to vote specifically on development aid to at least 11 countries Monday [23 November 1981].

The Foreign Ministry's budget for 1982 will be discussed by the Storting on Monday, and the budget recommendation from the committee on foreign affairs and constitutional reform was presented yesterday [16 November]. For the first time grants to Indonesia, Vietnam, and Egypt have been canceled, but there will be fights over Jamaica and to some extent Turkey as well. The Conservative Party has gone along with increasing grants to Kenya, Sri Lanka, Zambia, Botswana, and Zimbabwe beyond what the Willoch government proposed, with a corresponding reduction in the "mutual assistance" item of the budget.

It has long been known that the Conservative government would be voted down on the overall size of the development aid. The Christian People's Party and the Liberal Party have had a proposal in the committee for a long time for 1.1 percent of the GNP. The Conservatives' proposal of 1 percent will not be adopted, either, and that makes it likely that there will be a majority for the Labor Party government's proposal of 1.05 percent. It is also being emphasized that Norway is number 2 in the OECD with regard to the size of aid to development. Only the Netherlands is higher, of all the industrialized countries. There will also be a round of voting on appropriations for the UN soldiers in Lebanon, which will end with the total amount of 183 million kroner being divided between the Defense and Foreign Affairs ministries' budgets.

What undoubtedly will characterize the budget debate on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs this time is a mass of dissents when it comes to individual countries and how big the Norwegian aid shall be. The Conservative government will also be

voted down when it comes to grants, e.g., to the international work of Norwegian women's organizations and the National Council of Norwegian Youth Organizations, even though the changes will not be more than 50,000 kroner and 90,000 kroner respectively.

All parties in the committee on foreign affairs favor the Harlem Brundtland government's proposal for 83.5 million kroner for Kenya, while the Willoch government proposed to cut this down to 54.1 million kroner. The same applies to Sri Lanka, which will be unanimously given 63.4 million kroner according to the budget proposal yesterday.

The Center Party is getting together with the Labor Party and will get a majority for 244.7 million kroner for Tanzania, while the Christian People's Party and the Liberal Party are proposing a further increase and the Conservative Party is holding firm on the government's proposal for 204.7 million kroner. The majority justifies its proposal on the grounds that Tanzania is a country poor in resources and is in crisis, while the Conservative Party points out that aid to that country has been stepped up a great deal, and that today Tanzania is the country to which Norway gives the most aid. When it comes to Zambia, too, the Brundtland government's proposal of 56.9 million kroner will be adopted, in spite of both "overbids" and "underbids" from the other parties.

The Conservative Party, the Labor Party, and the Center Party ensure a majority for 4.5 million kroner for Madagascar, while the Christian People's Party and the Liberal Party will vote for 12 million kroner. The same majority combination will grant 27.4 million kroner to Botswana, while the minority would like to increase this by another 10 million kroner. The Conservative Party, on the other hand, is standing alone for 109 million kroner for India, while all of the other parties will appropriate a total of 124 million kroner for that country.

Bangladesh gets 157 million kroner with support from the Labor Party and the Center Party, while the Conservative Party wants to give it 117 million and the Christian People's Party and the Liberal Party 172 million kroner. Mozambique will get 66.1 million kroner with support from the Conservative Party, the Labor Party, and the Center Party. The same majority combination will give 100 million kroner to private organizations, while the Christian People's Party and the Liberal Party want to increase that appropriation to 130 million kroner.

The Conservative government had put Jamaica down for nothing, but the Labor Party, the Christian People's Party, and the Liberal Party will create a majority for giving the 20 million kroner that the Harlem Brundtland government had favored. The Conservative Party, the Christian People's Party, and the Center Party are in agreement on one thing. That is that aid to Turkey amounting to 3 million kroner shall be held up while waiting for a clarification of the political conditions in that country. The Labor Party and the Liberal Party want to strike out the appropriation completely.

Zimbabwe will get 60 million kroner, and the Liberal Party and the Christian People's Party will be voted down here on a proposal for another 20 million kroner. The Progressive Party and the Socialist Left Party have no members on the foreign affairs committee, and so during the budget debate there will undoubtedly be a swarm of proposals for increases or decreases.

Official Defends Aid Amounts

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 18 Nov 81 p 5

[Report by AFTENPOSTEN correspondent Elisabeth Holte]

[Excerpts] Paris, 17 Nov--Norwegian development next year is expected to come to more than 1 percent of the gross national product, or in kroner and øre ca. 3.6 billion kroner. That is an increase of 517 million kroner, or 17 percent, over this year.

It was Secretary of State Eivinn Berg of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that told AFTENPOSTEN that Tuesday [17 November] in Paris, where Berg is taking part in the high-level meeting of the OECD's development agency DAC [Development Assistance Committee].

"There will be no essential change from the line that has been followed; the Willoch government also gives priority to work for a better economic and social development," Berg says. "We shall continue the active part Norway has traditionally played in cooperation for a new world economic order."

"For Norway's part we shall emphasize here that there is no either-or, but rather a both-and," Berg explains. "For Norway's part we favor giving the energy question a high-priority place in DAC's program of work, and Norway is also very much interested in the question of the so-called 'mixed credits' as a form of financing in development aid work."

In that system two elements of financing are used, public credits at low interest combined with private, market-oriented credit. That form of financing, which Norway has not yet begun to use, is used, for example, to promote exports to other countries, and may have great importance for Norwegian industry at the same time that it helps the underdeveloped countries. A study group is working on that question in Norway, and Berg hopes that its work will be completed soon, so that Norway, too, can get started with the mixed credit arrangement in its development aid policy.

Effectiveness of UN Aid Doubted

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 24 Nov 81 p 3

[Commentary by Arne Finborud: "Development Aid in a New Light"]

[Text] Increasing skepticism concerning the United Nations' effectiveness as an intermediary in development aid will stamp the debate in the Storting on the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The United Nations' rôle is made a current issue by statements by Foreign Minister Svenn Stray, who is of the opinion that greater amounts of our development aid should go to what are called multinational projects, which in practice means that the funds would be channeled through the many different UN organizations.

But even in his own party Stray has encountered strong opposition to that view, a thing that finds expression in the recommendation of the foreign affairs committee, where even the Conservative members are adding greatly to the appropriations for direct Norwegian aid to individual underdeveloped countries. This is being done to restore the balance between bilateral and multilateral aid to development, so that funds will continue to be equally divided between the two fields.

- Foreign Minister Stray has had rough treatment from his own fellow party members, who have had some grounds. They have simply read the Conservative Party's own platform, which says that the growth in development aid shall go to the bilateral side. Stray obviously had not taken the trouble to read his party platform before he expressed himself to AFTENPOSTEN in favor of increasing multinational aid at the cost of bilateral aid.
- That brought out immediate reactions in the Conservative Storting delegation, where a number of younger members are now sitting who are experts on development aid, including Jan Pettersen, who has his work in NORAD [Norwegian Directorate for Development Aid], and Per Kristian Foss, who is a member of the NORAD board. They have seen to it that the Conservative Party changed its position in the committee on foreign affairs, thus handing Stray a painful defeat.
- It has drawn a good deal of attention that the only item Stray raised in the development aid budget over the Brundtland government's requests is the contribution to the United Nations Development Program, UNDP, which now gets 20 million kroner more than was originally proposed. Many believe that the explanation is simply that Stray's fellow party member Paul Thyness is one of the UNDP's many directors today, and that Thyness put in a good word for his organization with Stray.
- The skepticism about the United Nations' effectiveness that is now spreading in political circles here and abroad is based on experience with the United Nations' aid work, where an oversized bureaucracy characterizes the world organization. But the skepticism has also arisen from an impression that many people have gradually gotten that the United Nations has lost its power, that the world organization is becoming dominated by a very well-paid bureaucracy which sees its work as as a fine job and not from any more idealistic point of view.

One of the explanations for this state of things is that Secretary General Kurt Waldheim has bought good will for himself among the governments of the world by putting politicians in top jobs in the UN bureaucracy, and that the bureaucracy has thus lost its dynamism, because professionals are passed over, time after time, in favor of sometimes incompetent politicians and this blocks the road to advancement for the employees.

Many experienced UN people who came in during the first postwar period are shocked at the development in the world organization, and I know such people who assert that the United Nations today is rotting from the inside.

In particular it is pointed out that the disparity between all the splendid announcements that are produced at the large and small conferences that so abound in the United Nations and the measures taken to realize all the fine objectives

is so great that frustration spreads at a rapid pace throughout the UN apparatus. The only thing that is left is that the world organization is a career out of the ordinary for international bureaucrats.

Such points of view have for a long time characterized the debate on the United Nations in many other countries, but have not penetrated very much into Norway. Now that the Conservative Party has put a stop to Svenn Stray's attempt to favor multinational development aid at the expense of bilateral aid, however, there have been indications of such a tendency. In Norwegian development aid circles people cannot understand the Storting's simply writing out blank checks to the UN organizations and sending very few representatives to the so-called donor conferences of the organizations, while the bilateral aid is examined in a quite different and more thorough manner, every project being evaluated in NORAD. Big checks are sent to the United Nations, and with that we largely dismiss that part of Norwegian development aid, which constitutes half of our entire contribution, i.e., in practice, every other billion kroner.

Benkow Cites Record Appropriations

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 24 Nov 81

[Text] Next year Norway will give more to underdeveloped countries than ever before in history. In the debate on the foreign affairs budget for next year in the Storting yesterday, Jo Benkow, the Conservative Party's parliamentary leader, rejected the criticism by opposition leader Gro Harlem Brundtland that Willoch's government "is scraping together tax relief measures for the rich at the cost of those who are starving in underdeveloped countries." "Really that is a harsh judgment of the Labor Party's own earlier governments, which appropriated less in all those years than Norway will spend in the coming year," Jo Benkow pointed out.

"The great increase in aid that the Willoch government is now proposing puts the total ca. 20 percent higher than the appropriation for 1981," Benkow said, who remanded his hearers that when the Labor Party government appropriated 1.05 percent of the GNP for 1978, only 88 percent of it was used. When the percentage of the gross national product went down the next year, nobody accused the government of taking away from the hungry people in other countries, he pointed out.

The Conservative Party leader said we should not lose our sense of proportion on the size of development aid. It is the actual results achieved in underdeveloped countries that count, not how much money is appropriated. It is also important to get a broad expression of opinion on our development aid policy. "We must be prepared to fail once in a while without on that account using less successful methods as grounds for smaller investments," Jo Benkow said.

Gro Harlem Brundtland, the Labor Party's parliamentary leader, maintained that the difference between what the Conservative Party is now recommending and what her government proposed is not as slight as the Conservative Party claims.

"Countries like Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and Mozambique will certainly not agree that the difference is slight. Thirty million kroner less is a lot for Zimbabwe, and 40 million kroner less is a lot for Tanzania," said Gro Harlem Brundtland, and gave assurance that the Labor Party does not feel it justified to use development aid to balance tax relief.

Kjell Magne Fredheim (A [Labor Party]) took notice of the fact that the Conservative Party in the Storting is not in agreement with all of the Willoch government's proposals for cutbacks. He said that involved something approaching a revolt against the foreign minister. He also called it a very hard slap in the face. Jo Benkow denied that, and said that what the Conservative Storting delegation has been engaged in is an unbiased evaluation of current economy proposals.

Both Guttorm Hansen (A) and Einar Førde (A), however, praised Foreign Minister Svenn Stray for his position on the development in Turkey, and Førde hoped that the government would follow up on its commitment to democracy in that country in the various forums. Per Kristian Foss (H [Conservative]) took notice of the fact that the Center Party committee has advocated concentrating the development aid on fewer countries, and that more attention should be given to local conditions. Among other things it was pointed out that countries like India and Pakistan should be gradually cut out, to offset increased investments in our African cooperating countries. He is counting on it that the government will go in for a stronger concentration in order gradually to get a greater local effectiveness.

Fights over Support to 17 Underdeveloped Countries

It has been a long time since there was such great disagreement on the appropriations for the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and especially the development aid budget, as this year. The votes in the Storting took nearly 1.5 hours, and a large part of the time went to voting on the appropriations for the individual countries. There were dissents on a total of 17 countries. Sri Lanka was an exception. There was unanimous approval of an appropriation of 63.4 million kroner, although this was an increase over the Willoch government's proposal.

The Conservative Party, the Christian People's Party, the Liberal Party, the SV [Socialist Left Party], and the Progressive Party introduced a series of amendments providing for both increases and decreases for the individual countries, while the Labor Party in the main supported the amounts that the Brundtland government recommended before it went out.

Kenya will get 83.5 million kroner next year, Sri Lanka 63.4 million kroner, Tanzania 244.7 million kroner, Zambia 56.9 million kroner, India 124 million kroner, Madagascar 4.5 million kroner, Botswana 27.4 million kroner, Bangladesh 157 million kroner, Mozambique 66.1 million kroner, and Jamaica 20 million kroner. This last vote was carried by a narrow majority, 66, against 63 that favored increasing the appropriations. Turkey will get 3 million kroner, but the grant will be held back awaiting developments in the country. In addition, Zimbabwe will get 60 million kroner. Proposals for grants to Vietnam, Nicaragua, Angola, and others did not get the required support.

Carl I. Hagen (FrP [Progessive Party]) said that the other parties were competing to use as much money as possible for development aid, and he particularly attacked the Christian People's Party and said that the party is not as "temperate" on this question as on some others. He emphasized that it is not a matter of giving away one's own money, but of giving away money forcibly collected from others and then

boasting of wanting to give away as much as possible--hardly with support among the people. Hagen also urged that as far as possible goods and equipment should be bought in Norway, and not in other industrialized countries. Much of the Norwegian development aid goes directly to the United States, Great Britain, and the FRG, Hagen said, adding that returning seamen do not have so much to tell of the good that Norwegian development aid does, but there are a lot of examples of waste to be heard.

The Progressive Party introduced a great many proposals for reductions in Norwegian aid, but eventually the party voted for the Conservative Party's proposals for grants to specific countries.

71 Million for Help to Refugees in 1982

A unanimous social affairs committee in the Storting supports the Ministry of Social Affairs' proposal to appropriate 71 million kroner in next year's budget for aid to refugees that come to Norway. The social affairs committee says in its recommendation, however, that it wants to be informed about what functions the planned State Refugee Secretariat will have. The Storting's social affairs committee emphasizes in the recommendation that the secretariat's duties cannot be determined until there has been clarification among the departments and agencies concerned. The proposed appropriations will also cover certain expenditures for the Bataan camp in the Philippines.

Government Defeat Seen by Observer

Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 24 Nov 81 p 6

[Commentary by Pal Nordenborg]

[Text] The Storting adopted its own development aid budget this year when it debated the foreign affairs budget. That is to say, it agreed on a budget as if there had not been a Storting election in recent years. Foreign Minister Stray and Conservative parliamentary leader Benkow never batted an eye.

Benkow rejected the assertion that the Storting had given the government a slap in the face. "The foreign minister is pleased, the Conservative members of the foreign policy committee are pleased," he told Kjell Magne Fredheim, of the Labor Party. He assumed that Fredheim was pleased, too. Really it sounded as if Benkow were more inclined to say: That is not a thing to keep talking about: you got what you wanted. Shut up and look happy.

It was also a debate without big collisions and dramatic outbursts, to quote Guttorm Hansen. The political dramatics were brought out beforehand, in the finance debate. Now in the final debate the government's position had already been set aside and forgotten. It was with some surprise that Einar Førde was heard to say that with this proposal the government had gotten its most serious defeat in the budget debate thus far.

But in spite of Benkow's and Stray's smiling politeness, they did not manage to conceal the fact that the forces opposing increased Norwegian development aid have grown stronger recently. Now the opposition to Norwegian development aid has also become more humorless. The self-celebrating Carl I. Hagen, who was so quick to

come up with Bible quotations yesterday, should incorporate into his collection of quotations Anders Lange's satirical couplet: "Hva du evner, kast av/i Det indiske hav." [Whatever you are able, throw into the Indian Ocean.]

The government lost the battle on two fronts this time. First, there is no support in the Storting for a change in the main lines of Norwegian development aid policy away from bilateral cooperation. Second, the Storting rejected the government's bookkeeping trick to carry out its promise of tax relief at the expense of aid to the underdeveloped countries. Even the parties committed to cooperation did not go along with cutting back on these items to make room for tax adjustments as an instrument of domestic politics.

Harald Synnes of the Christian People's Party cautiously came out with a thought for the future: "We, too, think there will be limits. But as long as Norwegian private consumption characterized by luxuries keeps increasing, there may be grounds for looking more closely at the economic reasons cited for restricting development aid."

He pointed out that it is still true that the underdeveloped countries receive less in contributions from other countries than they owe in money and pay in interest.

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POLITICAL NORWAY

STUDY ANALYZES REGIONAL SUPPORT PATTERNS FOR RIGHT


Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 28 Nov 81 p 3

[Article by Tor Bjørklund and Bernt Hagtvedt: "Conservative Party and FrP--Duet or Duel?"]

[Text] When the Conservative wave has grown high—up to 40 percent or more—if it does not swell higher, it does foam more. And the foam on the wave, the Progressive Party [FrP], gains precisely where the Conservative Party's support seems to have hit a ceiling, e.g. in the area around the Oslo Fjord. But that pattern is not the only one that strikes the eye when the 1981 Storting election rolls out of the computer. Since the middle of the 1970's both the Conservative Party and the Progressive Party have made especially great gains in municipalities marked by oil and gas operations. This shows up especially in Rogaland and Hordaland, but also shows up in the north, e.g. in Harstad. An important question will be: Will the Conservative Party's and the FrP's fight for votes shape up in the future as a duet or a duel?

The above pattern will hardly be changed by the coming reelection in Troms and Buskerud. And one thing is sure: the Conservative wave arose in earnest before the 1981 election. In a way, this year's contest was something of a repercussion. The Conservative vote passed the 30-percent mark, rising from 29.9 to 31.7 percent. While this may not seem like much, these figures do not give a complete picture of the party's results if we go down to the individual municipality. The gain was greatest in sparsely populated areas. In the agricultural districts of Norway the Conservative party rose between 1979 and the present from an average just below 17 percent to 20 percent. In the most populous municipalities, on the other hand, where the party was very strong beforehand, the Conservatives saw a slight decline. This applies, e.g., to Oslo, Bærum, Drammen, Stavanger, and Bergen. It may be concluded from this that beyond a certain point the Conservative Party has problems with a further influx of voters. In the old heartland of the Conservative Party--in the area surrounding the Oslo Fjord--and in the new, inside and outside of the cities in Rogaland and Hordaland, it appears that the Conservative wave has reached a ceiling.

The map of Southern Norway [next page] showing the FrP's percentages of the vote in the fall Storting elections confirms that the party often did well where the Conservative Party stood still or lost a little. In some places both clearly



gained. The township of Tysvær, in Rogaland, is an especially interesting example: that is where Kårstø is located, where the North Sea gas is to be brought ashore. And the voters seem to have reacted by giving increased support to the parties that have said least about the negative consequences of the oil exploitation—or taken the most positive attitude toward it. At the same time Tysvær and other places like it show trends in favor of the Conservative Party and against the parties of the center.

FrP and the Opposition's Privilege

The example of Bærum will serve to illustrate this aspect of the poll. In that municipality the Conservative Party made its best showing in the country, getting 56.5 percent of the vote. In comparison to 1971 this is a slight decline (1 to 2 percent). But precisely in these core districts of the Conservative Party, the FrP also scored high. One possible explanation may be that in municipalities with such a high percentage of Conservatives, the mayor is often a Conservative. For that reason the party did not have the opposition's privilege in the election campaign, at least in the election to municipal offices. This admittedly very modest decline for the Conservative Party and gain for the FrP thus gives a warning of coming political attrition and an increased support for the FrP in the Storting election of 1985.

Foam on the Conservative Wave

The Progressive Party has been characterized as the foam on the conservative wave. On the basis of the election statistics this metaphor can be interpreted as meaning that when the Conservative wave--with a capital C--runs high, up to 40 percent or more, it will not swell higher, but will foam all the more.

The FrP support has peaked at two points, in 1973 and this year [1981]. There is an interesting similarity between the support then and now. In percentage the support has dropped somewhat, from 5.0 to 4.5 percent, but the number of Storting members is the same, 4, and from the same counties: Hordaland, Rogaland, Akershus, and Oslo. This recurring pattern is noteworthy. Polls show that no [other] Norwegian parties are built on such an unstable group of voters as the FrP, but the shifting voters appear to shift within municipal boundaries. The election results in Oslo will serve as an illustration of the fact that in 1973 and 1981 the FrP got about the same support on the basis of a somewhat different voter following.

FrP Voters--From West to East

Both in 1973 and in 1981 there was a certain difference for the Progressive Party letween Oslo East and Oslo West. In Anders Lange's breakthrough in 1973 the party had its weakest support-below 3 percent-in typical east-side precincts like Vahl and Lilleborg. There the Labor Party traditionally had massive support. In 1981, however, it was precisely in certain old workingmen's districts on the east side that the FrP got a good vote. Scores of up to 10 percent can be found in such districts as Gamlebyen and Kampen. There appears to have been a gradual shift from west to east. In an intervening election, the municipal election of 1979, there was practically no difference between typical east and west-side precincts in the support for the FrP. A common trait of all elections is that the FrP is strong in the satellite towns.

Glistrupian Voter Profile

There is now a good deal to indicate that the Progressive Party's supporters, as far as occupational background is concerned, have approached what we might call a Glistrupian voter profile. For several years Glistrup's party in Denmark has been the second largest worker's party in Denmark. The working-class percentage of Glistrup's voters appears to be about the same as in the Danish population as a whole--a little under 40 percent. Thus it is the size of the party, rather

than any overrepresentation among the workers, that gives Glistrup the position that the Conservative Party has here in Norway as the second largest worker's party.

Young Men Go to the Right

Anders Lange--like Glistrup--recruited relatively well among independent business and professional people. Among government employees, on the other hand, we found a different pattern: overrepresentation in the Norwegian party and underrepresentation in the Danish one. Polls done by Norwegian Market Data in the fall of 1980 indicate that the worker percentage has increased at the cost of government employees, so that the ratios of workers, government employees, and independent business and professional people is very comparable to Glistrup's voters. We do find a divergence, however, in the age structure. The Progressive Party in Denmark is not a well-marked youth party. In 1973 and 1974, on the other hand, the ALP [Anders Lange's Party] was a definitely youthful party: 40 percent of the voters were under 30 years of age. In this year's election the FrP again appears as a youth party, with a concentration among young men. In the 18 to 24 age group 17 percent of the men voted FrP, according to a study that the Central Statistical Office did for the election researcher Henry Valen. Over 50 percent of the FrP voters in the 1981 election were men. The same was true of the ALP.

For the country as a whole there is a clear connection between a high percentage for the Conservatives and seepage into the Progressive Party. This pattern breaks down, however, when we look at the individual precincts in Oslo. Where the FrP does best (e.g., in Groruddalen, where the party gets 10 percent in certain precincts), the Conservative Party is definitely below its overall showing in Oslo. Elsewhere in the country the Conservative Party and the FrP largely vary together. In the radical belt of electoral geography--Telemark, Oppland, Hedmark--both parties make a poor showing.

Conservative Party's Weakest Areas

In the elections of 1969 and 1973 the Conservative Party made its weakest showing --under 5 percent--in certain municipalities in the southwest and west and in Nord-Østerdalen, Gudbrandsdalen, Vestre Telemark, and Nord-Trøndelag. Except for the south and west the Conservative Party is still weakest in those areas. Today, however, the percentages are almost never below 10, and most often between 10 and 15 percent. The most important difference between the southwestern municipalities where the Conservative Party has pressed forward and reached a level often clearly above 20 percent and the areas where the party still encounters a good deal of resistance is the strength of the Labor Party. That party has traditionally been strong in agricultural districts in the interior of East Norway and been pressed back by the parties of the center in the southwest. It appears that the partial collapse of the Liberal Party has made it noticeably easier for non-socialist voters to vote Conservative.

Conservative Governmen Flow of Voters to the FrP?

An important factor in the time to come will be the Progressive Party's ability to make inroads in the Conservative Party's voter support. If we are to judge by the Danish example, it may look as if Glistrup's support were independent of the hue of the government. But on the other hand, Glistrup has, more than the Norwegian

FrP, looked upon all parties—"the old parties"—as his opponents. Here in Norway the FrP makes a point of sticking mostly to the Conservative Party and giving it a nudge in its own direction. Other attempts to keep neighboring parties "in order" have not gone very far, e.g. the SV's [Socialist Left Party's] rôle in relation to the Labor Party recently. If the same tactic is now tried on the right end of the spectrum, it will be a development well worth following closely. In any case the voters will do so.

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POLITICAL SWEDEN

VPK ORGAN SUMMARIZES PARTY CONGRESS DEBATES, RESOLUTIONS

Stockholm NY DAG in Swedish 27 Nov-1 Dec 81 pp 4-5

[Text] Many long debates and much committee work is behind the statements on democracy and socialism which the 26th Congress of the VPK [Left-Wing Communist Party] has now adopted.

The debate was heated all the way up to the decisions of the Congress. Finally adjustments could be made, and unity achieved in a unanimous resolution.

Two different lines or tendencies could be detected: One felt that the very debate on democracy and socialism weakened socialism and was conducted on the conditions of the bourgeois propaganda. The other wanted to define the problem away and make socialism pure and simple.

Thus, the 26th Congress of the VPK adopted a resolution on democracy and socialism after many years of debate and work. It was one of the high points of the Congress, and the debate was fierce until the decision was reached. Slightly more than 20 speakers participated in the debate on democracy.

Almost all the speakers began by praising Lars Herlitz and the party board for a brilliant introduction to the debate. We cannot possibly say, like one of our former party chairmen did about 20 years ago when he said, among other things, "Since we do not have the honor for the progress of the socialist countries, we don't have to take responsibility for the mistakes made there." On the contrary, we are responsible for the development of socialism; we are obliged to learn from the history of socialism and the actual problems.

"And here no one is of help," Lars Herlitz said. "Phenomena which we must evaluate and in regard to which we must take a position continue to exist, even if we change their names. The wage-earners in our country know that the socialist countries have abolished capitalism. But they know also that certain aspects in the social life of these countries, such as bureaucratic power, violation of rights, and limitations of democratic rights and freedom, are things for which they don't want to fight."

Two Lines

Two distinct lines could be detected in the following debate.

One held in brief that it was actually the bourgeois propaganda which led the VPK into this debate, in order to push the party back ideologically, and that the question was of minor importance.

"Just as soon as the bourgeois take up the unsatisfactory state of affairs in the socialist countries, then we have to get out there and explain and defend," said Martin Levander from greater Stockholm. "We have to have time to devote ourselves to our important tasks."

Martin Levander said that the party executive board had not been responsible, and informed all new members as to what the party's line has actually been since 1964.

Ulf Jannson, from greater Stockholm, pointed out that in the United States millions of people are denied the most basic rights such as employment, housing and medical care.

"The bourgeois want to push us back," he said. "First, they want us to disassociate ourselves from the socialist countries, then they will try to get us to disassociate ourselves from history, next to disassociate ourselves from Lenin and Marx. And so it will continue."

Freddy Jansson, from Goteborg, wanted the resolution to address the evil deeds of U.S. imperialism against democracy.

Sten Wiktorsson, from greater Stockholm, said that the discussion regarding the questions of democracy must not end, even if the Congress approves a resolution. He was of the opinion that an explanation for the faulty democracy was the division of labor, which is the same in both the east and the west.

"We also need a theory regarding the socialist exercise of power in Sweden," he said.

Analyses

And with that, we get to the second line which came through in the debate. The speakers did not want an analysis as to why the socialist countries developed as they did, that is to say, with serious gaps in democratic rights and freedoms.

This line was pushed primarily by Per Kageson from Stockholm. He was of the opinion that since socialism is a democratic ideology, there must be some flaws in the socialist countries. Scientific analyses of the situation there are needed in order to understand what has gone wrong. Per Kageson wanted to task a working group in the VPK with developing such an analysis.

He said, "the resolution contains no explanation for the extensive and systematic restrictions on democratic rights and freedoms. Why not? What is the reason? And one talks about an expansion of democracy. But no democracy exists; in Czechoslovakia, for example, there is no positive tendency towards development.

Lars Herlitz countered Per Kageson and said that the VPK does not have the resources to make such an analysis, which instead must be made by the people themselves in these countries.

Eva Wigforss, from Skane, regarded the resolution as good on the whole, but wanted a notation that people-based movements for democracy and freedom of speech in the socialist countries should be encouraged by the party.

This demand was also pushed by Per Kageson in the editorial committee, which had the task of coordinating all the demands and proposals after the debate.

The Oppression of Women

Birgitta Fransson, from greater Stockholm, wanted a stronger statement on the oppression of women in Sweden.

"It should say that the condition for women's opportunities is that the patriarchal system be broken," she said.

Despite the fierce debate, the editorial committee and the Congress succeeded in coordinating their views. After some changes in the proposal submitted by the party's executive board in their resolution on democracy and socialism (see NY DAG No 72), it could be adopted unanimously by the Congress.

The changes in the proposal included a demand for the constitutional right to strike and for militant trade union tactics, and in accordance with Birgitta Fransson's proposal, it should read: "Opportunities are to be provided for men and women to be able to participate on an equal basis in society's work. The ideological struggle must continually support the liberation of women."

In addition, it included a statement that the education of immigrants in their native language must be made obligatory.

Psychiatry

The motions on international questions also included those which concerned questions of democracy. The VPK's Lund had made one which demanded that the Congress condemn the Soviets' use of psychiatry as a means to suppress viewpoints.

The executive board of the party had presented, with a divided vote, a report made by Gunnar Agren in which he referred to the psychiatric oppression of people in the capitalist countries, principally the United States.

Carina Svensson, from Skane, regarded it as a ridiculous answer which did not consider what was actually involved in the motion, namely, injustice by means of psychiatry in the Soviet Union.

She was supported by members of the party's executive board. Bo Hammar, who had expressed his reservations about the statement in the party's executive committee, regarded it as awkward and poor, and said that it should be sent back to the editorial committee for redrafting. Jorn Svensson agreed, and said that one should say forthrightly how psychiatry is used in the Soviet Union, where there is evidence that even people who might commit a "crime against society" or who have "a dissenting aggressive attitude" are put into mental hospitals.

"Should such criteria be used here, probably most of us would end up in mental hospitals," said Jorn Svensson.

The Congress decided instead to state that the VPK disassociated itself from the misuse of psychiatry with political and oppressive objectives and that there were examples of this in socialist countries, the Soviet Union among others, and in capitalist countries, the United States among others.

Ties

Other motions concerned the international ties of the VPK. Per Kageson wanted the VPK to sever its ties with the Soviet Communist Party, except in those questions where there was agreement. Moreover, he said, the term "brother party" should not be used.

Bo Hammar, the party's international secretary and a member of its executive board, said that it would be unfortunate to sever ties with any party. In the tense world situation, we should instead expand our ties to include all socialist and progressive movements in the world, which work for peace and democracy and against imperialism.

And do we have to get hung up on whether we shall say brother party, sister party or brother-sister party? What kind of unnecessary liturgy is that, he wondered, and received the support of the congress.

6893

CSO: 3109/55

MILITARY DENMARK

PAPER COMMENTS ON POLL, SEES INCREASED DEFENSE CONCERN

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 9 Dec 81 p 2

[Editorial]

[Text] There are things we agree about in this country and that is not the least important factor. After the election campaign of recent weeks which of necessity emphasized internal conflicts it is good to see that there is a clear and resolute majority of the public in favor of the most important element in our foreign policy: Danish membership in the NATO alliance. In a fall dominated in West Europe by sizable peace demonstrations with a tendency toward neutralist nationalism it is healthy to have it confirmed that close to two-thirds of the Danish people support our participation in the NATO cooperation while less than a fifth are opposed. Defense determination has not weakened and faith in the alliance is unshaken.

The Gallup Institute's surveys of attitudes toward NATO have shown through the years that the current international situation affects the outcome of individual polls. If relations between East and West are more tense there are more who support NATO and fewer who oppose it. It is therefore correct to take into account that the latest poll was conducted against the background of the Swedish submarine affair and the domestic espionage case. There were 59 percent for and 18 percent against. Last year the figures were 58 for and 18 against with Afghanistan as the background. But the year before Afghanistan the figures were 55 for and 19 against.

These are modest differences. They were much greater in the early years of the NATO alliance during the Cold War and the Vietnam War. But it is precisely the special value of these recurring opinion polls that taken as a whole they show long-range tendencies in public opinion and there they give a very clear picture of Danish attitudes toward NATO. After the big fluctuations in the 1950's and 1960's Danish attitudes clarified up through the 1970's. In that decade which was characterized by relaxation of tensions between East and West support for NATO grew steadily from around 49 percent to around 57 percent of the population and that tendency is continuing.

It must be seen as an expression of the Danish people's political understanding and maturity that they have recognized NATO's importance as a prerequisite for

detente. The desire to remove one's jacket when the sun shines did not affect defense determination in the years of detente. On the contrary, confidence in NATO was reinforced. This is a useful message for the political parties that had such a hard time achieving a new defense compromise in the past year. And it should be of particular interest to the Social Democrats who can see from the opinion polls that attitudes among Social Democratic voters are quite similar to the national average: there are 55 percent supporting and 17 percent opposing NATO. There is a clear majority for a solid defense policy among Social Democrats too.

6578

CSO: 3106/29

POLL INDICATES STRONGEST SUPPORT FOR NATO SINCE 1957

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 4 Dec 81 p 7

[Article by Chr. Brondum]

[Text] Danish support for NATO is now higher than it has been since the Russians launched the first Sputnik in 1957.

That is shown by the latest Gallup poll on the public's attitude toward NATO membership. There are 59 percent for, 18 percent against with 23 percent replying "don't know." The poll was conducted in November.

Gallup has surveyed the public attitude toward NATO each year since Denmark became a member in 1949 and finds with the latest survey that there has been a shift in attitude from around 40 percent for NATO at the start of the alliance to around 60 percent now. Opposition has been around 20 percent in recent years.

In a commentary Social Democratic member of parliament and activist in the peace movement Jytte Hilden noted that the survey showed much greater support among men (72 percent) than among women (only 47 percent). Among women 32 percent answered "don't know" and among 15-24-year-olds 31 percent answered "don't know."

"It shows there is a need to set up a realistic alternative to NATO as the basis for a discussion on NATO membership. It is obvious than men choose to respond to uncertainty in the world in traditional ways, in other words through strength in NATO membership, while women and young people are unsure. It is worth a discussion," says Jytte Hilden.

She was glad there is such broad support for NATO. "Anything else would be painful and unpleasant. But we must keep thinking in alternative channels," she says.

Radical Liberal member of parliament Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen said that even if people support NATO it does not mean they want higher military spending. Conservative Palle Simonsen said that a future government has received support for a higher degree of solidarity with our NATO allies.

6578

CSO: 3106/29

POLL CONFIRMS LONG-TERM INCREASE IN SUPPORT FOR NATO


Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 4 Dec 81 p 7

[Article by Danish Gallup Institute director Asger Schultz]

[Text] Since the formation of the Atlantic Treaty in 1949 the Gallup Institute has followed the people's attitude toward Danish membership.

In these surveys a representative cross-section of the adult population is asked this question:

"Are you for or against Danish participation in the Atlantic Treaty (NATO)?"



Key:

1. For NATO

2. Against NATO

The latest survey was conducted by the institute in November and it showed that between half and two-thirds of the population supported Danish membership in NATO with 18 percent opposed.

Experience from the many surveys covering almost a generation shows that attitudes toward Danish membership in NATO are strongly influenced by various events of political importance but that these influences have been shortlived.

It is therefore of special interest to try and view the change in people's attitudes toward NATO over the entire period.

To illustrate this the graph shows the percentage of supporters and opponents of Danish NATO membership since the organization was founded.

Thus the latest survey is a confirmation of the long-term development that could be observed since around 1960.

One can say roughly that public support for Danish membership since then and up to the present has increased relatively by around 50 percent, from approximately 40 percent around 1960 to around 60 percent now.

Opposition has also risen since 1960 but it seems to have held steady since the middle of the 1970's at a level right around 20 percent.

The following chart breaks down the responses by certain groups of people:

Breakdown	For Danish NATO mem- bership	Against Danish NATO membership	Don't know	Total
All respondents	59 %	18 %	23 %	100 %
By party affiliation:				
Right of Social Democrats Social Democrats Left of Social Democrats	77 55 25	12 17 71	11 28 4	100 100 100
By sex:				
Men Women	7 2 47	16 21	12 32	100 100
By age:				
15-24 25-39 40-59 60 and older	47 60 66 61	22 21 14 16	31 19 20 23	100 100 100 100
By educational level:				
Basic schooling Secondary school Higher education	59 66 52	16 15 34	25 19 14	100 100 100

As one can see Danish security policy has solid political backing from Social Democratic voters and voters for the nonsocialist parties.

It is striking that women have a much higher "don't know" percentage than men and that they have considerably more reservations about NATO.

If we ignore the "don't know" group, 82 percent of the men support NATO membership compared to only 69 percent of the women.

It can also be seen that it is especially the youngest group that opposes membership and, especially relatively, that a higher level of education correlates with lower support for Danish NATO membership. If we again ignore the "don't know" group almost 80 percent of those with the least education favored NATO membership compared to only 60 percent among those with the best educations.

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6578

CSO: 3106/29

MILITARY

FALSTER TOWN COUNCIL PROHIBITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LIMITS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 3 Dec 81 p 3

[Text] The major city on Falster, Nykobing, has banned atomic weapons and atomic weapons stockpiles within city limits. This happened at a city council meeting by a vote of 14 out of the council's 21 members. They consisted of 12 Social Democrats, one Radical Liberal and one member of the Socialist People's Party though that party's original proposal to ban access to foreign troops as well did not come to a vote.

"It has no practical importance and the superpowers probably won't pay any attention to our vote," said Mayor B. Jorgensen (2 [as published]). "But it is intended as a demonstration of a determination for peace and if it gains attention in the media the objective has been achieved. During the debate we were warned against taking a vote because Nykobing might disturb the superpower negotiations in Geneva but there is no reason to make fun of this. We have expressed our opinion at the request of a meeting of voters."

Liberals and Conservatives abstained from voting. Deputy Mayor J. Vidbrad (C [Center]) commented: "It is political nonsense and we won't participate in it. On a national political level the issue was started by SF [Socialist People's Party] which is trying to have such motions adopted in all town and city councils and the Social Democrats and Radical Liberals were carried away by this nonsense. The matter belongs in parliament and we extended ourselves far enough to suggest that the matter be postponed until later when the contents of the talks going on at a higher level between the Soviet Union and the United States are known. By the way we don't have any military forces in Nykobing Falster--the nearest soldiers live in Vordingborg."

6578

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GENERAL

CIVIL SERVANTS DEMAND RESIGNATION OF ADEDY LEADERSHIP

Dissociation of Unions

Athens TA NEA in Greek 20 Nov 81 pp 1, 5

[Text] The immediate resignation of the leadership and the president of ADEDY [Supreme Administrative Committee of Civil Servants], Mr. Papakostas was demanded yesterday by the representatives of the elementary and high school teachers, as well as by the representatives of other civil servants organizations, who represent two thirds of the ADEDY forces. The pertinent instrument was filed with the General Council of ADEDY.

The action of the progressive representatives of the civil servants organizations who, as soon as they filed the statement, withdrew from the general council, caused great turmoil in the council and, over the ensuing pandemonium, the voice of Mr. Papakostas could be heard as a monologue, "Those who wish to leave, may leave. We will continue alone to guard the trade union rights of the employees..."

Accomplished Facts...

The general council was hurriedly called into an extraordinary session evidently for the purpose of making decisions which could be considered as accomplished facts in view of the government's statements about its program. The sudden decision of ADEDY to call a meeting of the general council—it was scheduled to take place after the declarations of the government—— reveals its intention to submit on time, before Sunday, its memorandum on the new pay scales being processed by a special committee.

The main subject of yesterday's daily agenda was precisely the debate on the matter of the pay scale. At the meeting, which was called late yesterday afternoon, 81 councilors participated and the debate continued despite the withdrawal of the teachers, fiscal and treasury employees, and other representatives of civil servants.

The primary and secondary education teachers, along with the other civil servants, demanded the following:

The admission of all civil servants organizations into the ADEDY,

The immediate resignation of the general council and the convocation of a new convention.

The expulsion of the "rubber-stamp-phantom" associations,

The drafting of a new labor policy for the protection of the interests of the civil servants.

They Withdrew

In its letter, the DOE [Teachers Federation of Greece] defined its position and explained the resons that led to its withdrawal, underlining that:

"ADEDY is trying once more to disorient the civil servants and to lead the labor movement along the lines dictated by its protectors. The DOE refused to be a part of the special commission which devised the new pay scales-grades and withdrew from the discussions because it considers it ridiculous that ADEDY should submit proposals on the subject of salaries, raises with cost-of-living adjustments, and tax relief at a time when it is known that the present administration of ADEDY does not express the true interests of the civil servants.

The OLME [Federation of Secondary School Teachers], for its part, claims that it is not dispoded to accept the present administration of ADEDY and to sanction with its presence the selling out of the interests of the civil servants. The OLME, after denouncing the scheming and stances of the ADEDY administrative group, withdrew from the general council stating that it believes that ADEDY's aim is not the promotion of a uniform pay scale, but the consolidation of the same group in the leadership of the civil servants' trade union.

The Federation of Fiscal Employees also dissented with the tactics of ADEDY and emphasized "that the interest of the present administration of ADEDY on the subject of pay scales comes at an inappropriate time, even before the new government has made its position known, with the evident purpose of creating sensationalism."

Other Organizations

In addition to these positions which are also maintained by the employees of the Ministry of Public Works, by the employees of the National Printing Office, by the employees of the Auditing Council, by the Panhellenic Union of Correctional Institutions, and by many others, the withdrawal of the representaitves of the organizations that represent the actual membership in the ADEDY, was carried out as a protest to demand the replacement of the leadership of ADEDY for anti-union actions which basically concern:

The non-voting on the financial accounting (it should have taken place during the first quater of 1981). The failure to include on the daily agenda important matters to be discussed. The indifference of ADEDY's leadership towards the regular meeting of the general council (instead of 10 meetings in 1981,

only four took place). The lack of power of ADEDY to fill the positions of the Executive Committee and the fact that, to date, the committee does not know the exact number of organizations enrolled in ADEDY and the number of members they represent.

Teachers' Unions Opposition to ADEDY

Athens TA NEA in Greek 20 Nov 22 pp 1,5

[Text] The progressive forces in the civil servant sector, led by the Teachers Federation and the Federation of Secondary School Teachers, call upon all organizations of civil servants, which are not part of the Right, to close ranks in order to overthrow the "illegitimate" (as they claim) administrative group of ADEDY.

In addition, the representatives of the progressive employees who represent two-thirds of the strength of ADEDY, are against the manner in which the interests of the employees are currently managed by the administrative group; they are against the scheming perpetrated by it, and they refuse to permit the "insiders" of the Right to play the role of protectors of the workers

The ADEDY, which was founded in 1945 by constituent act (59/45), superseded the Greek Civil Servants Confederation which had obtained, by means of struggles and strikes, substantial benefits for the civil servants (such as the uniform job grade, shorter hours, etc.). Since that time, the administration of ADEDY had depended on the apparatus of the Right, which for 40 long years governed Greece. No administration was ever democratic; no general council made decisions of substance regarding the problems of the civil servants; and not until 1955, at the 12th General Employee Convention, under pressure of acute problems, the then-leadership of ADEDY was unanimously condemned and ousted.

In 1958, for the first time, the new leadership of ADEDY, in conjunction with the government was forced by the aroused divil servants to promise to make a study of a uniform pay scale which, however, remained a mere promise.

Other administrations followed, other presidents, other councilors, always, though, of the Right, and always oriented powards governmental trade unionism.

Protests

Since 1945 to date, the ADEDY has held 24 conventions and, especially during the last one which took place in Athens in September 1979, the democratic organizations of civil servants raised a storm of protests and characterized ADEDY as illegitimate and non-representative. At this convention, during which Mr. Papakostas and his group were again reconfirmed, the DOE [Teachers Federation of Greece] and the Civil Servants of Salonica (EDOTh) petitioned to have it invalidated.

The petition was not accepted for typical reasons, but the totality of the civil servants even today continues to protest the decision for valid reasons.

At that convention several phantom-organizations, such as the Association of "Assistant Visitors" which is a private organization (!) participated illegally. Representatives who had not been elected by their organizations (such as the representatives of Customs employees and the present president of ADEDY, Mr. Papakostas, who himself has not been elected by his colleagues) also participated.

Participating in the convention were organizations and associations about which no one knows the exact number or the aggregate of their membership. Rubber-stamp associations, whose seals the president of ADEDY himself keeps in his drawer.

At the convention, the by-laws were violated in a dictatorial manner despite the outcry of the democratic employees. Actually, the election of the Supervisory Committee did not take place by secret balloting. The counting of the ballots was interrupted and the ballot boxes were locked up in the rest rooms. The OLME [Federation of Secondary School Teachers] was excluded, while the representatives of the fiscal employees were accepted, despite the fact that they had not been elected according to the by-laws.

The phantom associations, whose purpose it is to alter the true representation of the civil servants and to support Mr. Papakostas' group, were created by means of unprecedented scheming. One example is the Panhellenic Union of Women Civil Servants whose president is Mrs. Karathanasis, a relative of the Karathanasis who was president of ADEDY at the time of the junta.

In essence, this union does not represent any concrete labor sector. Another phantom union moves within the KYP [Central Intelligence Service]; another is hiding among the employees of the Argolis Nome. These unions, which in actuality do not represent any employees, alter the composition of the general council where they succeed in having a representative while the larger organizations do not have representatives.

This opportunity is offered them by the by-laws of ADEDY which are tailored to their order. As a result, the primary teachers, with 40,000 members have only 10 representatives, OLME with 30,000, has only three representatives, while the union of Argolis, with approximately 30 members, has one representative....

The by-laws of ADEDY, which were altered at the last convention, actually strangle the freedoms of the civil servants labor unions and ignore every democratic expression. In the meantime, the progressive representatives of the civil servants organizations have never abandoned the struggle for the cleaning up and democratization of ADEDY.

Their demand for setting ADEDY's records straight and the expulsion of the "phantom -rubber stamp" unions, is a rare petition. A firm request was and is the enrollment of all the organizations. For years now they have demanded a true focusing on their petitions, which ADEDY has systematically avoided.

Suddenly, day-before-yesterday, the administration of ADEDY, at a special meeting called by it, attempted to portray a different role and to mislead the civil servants by proposing a uniform pay scale, by hypocritically out-doing itself and thus give the appearance of working in the interests of the civil servants, something it has not done up to now.

They Withdrew

Precisely because of this "strange" position, the representatives of the 10 progressive organizations withdrew from the general council and denounced this new scheme and refused to recognize Mr. Papakostas and his group as the spokesmen for their interests. And they denounce:

OLME [Federation of Secondary School Teachers] (Dimitrios Kitsios, vice-pressident): "The leadership group of ADEDY has impaired authority. Under no circumstances will we accept being represented by it any longer. Its antiemployee stand in the past has condemned it in the hearts of the teachers. We are not against a really uniform pay scale, but we are against the scheming of ADEDY. We call on its leadership to resign and to proceed in the convocation of a genuinely representative convention."

DOE [Teachers Federation of Greece] (Kyriakos Georgiadis, president): "The present leadership of ADEDY is a captive of its social perceptions concerning the form and substance of the labor movement and is incapable of giving the just and protracted demands of the civil servants the proper consideration. Mr. Papakostas and his advisers not only do not have a positive plan to offer, but they have abandoned a common front with the employees' organizations in times of difficult stuggles."

Fiscal Employees (Kharis Theokharidis, Ilias Mbograkos, president and secretary general): "We, the fiscal employees, disapprove of the ADEDY leadership and especially of its president with his known past and we do not aknowledge that he has, under any circumstances, the right to express and promote our interests. We demand the immediate resignation of this leadership and we state that we will fight for its ouster, our only goal being the democratization of ADEDY, which then will have the authority to claim militantly the just demands of the civil servants."

The same views and positions are held by the other representatives who withdrew from the general council day-before-yesterday. Together, they represent 90,000 civil servants. We wish to point out that the entire ADEDY membership is composed of 120,000 members. With the schemes in the general council, the progressive forces are today represented by approximately 20 councilors, while the minority of the Right is represented by 60 councilors.

Warlike Statements

"The 22 councilors who withdrew day-before-yesterday from the meeting of the general council of ADEDY played partisan politics and by their action attempted to politicize ADEDY. Their stand is demagogic. We have now entered the

phase of settling matters in ADEDY. We will crush those who wish to overthrow us. We will use any means against the attempt at deviation in the trade union movement of the civil servants."

With these "warlike" statements, the president of ADEDY, Mr. Papakostas, emphasized in his press conference with 'NEA' yesterday that neither he nor ADEDY's leadership have any intention of resigning "and they will stand up and fight those who play partisan politics within ADEDY."

At the same time, the Executive Committee of ADEDY, which has sided with the same "hard-line" spirit of the statements made by Mr. Papakostas, declared, "The great majority of ADEDY's leadership will not bend under the schemes and pressures exerted unremittingly by some of the partisan leaders who show their true colors more and more as time goes by."

The press conference of Mr. Papakostas is set forth below:

[Question] Representatives in the general council of ADEDY accuse you of being an illegitimate leadership and have called for your resignation. What do you intend to do?

[Answer] We will not resign. We will stand and face the raiders of ADEDY. We have been elected by democratic procedures and will remain faithful to our duty.

[Question] There is a serious charge that the representation in the general council of ADEDY does not reflect the corresponding numerical strength of civil servant organizations. Low-memmbership organizations or rubber stamp organizations, in other words non-existent ones, have more representatives than large-membership organizations. What is actually happening among the members of the general council?

[Answer] All the members of the general council have been elected according to the by-laws. The Teachers Federation, which is protesting more than the others, has 10 representatives in the 85-member general council of ADEDY. Its 10 representatives are proportionate to the 20,100 members which the Teachers Federation reported to us as their membership or to the 40,000, which they now claim to have. The employees of the National Printing Office, with 500 employees, have one representative. These are the proportions. Let the teachers who shout and are asking to install additional representatives on the council, come out and tell us officially that they have created shadow unions in order to present a larger union membership. Rubber stamp associations do not exist in ADEDY. Those who claim the contrary need do nothing more than present thei case in court in order to find out which these organizations are and under whose cover they operate.

[Question] Why you do not call for regular general meetings in ADEDY as established by ADEDY by-laws?

[Answer] We had four general meetings in 1981. The fifth did not take place because the teachers objected to the absence of a quorum. In July and August

we did not call for meetings because of summer vacations. In October there was no meeting because of the elections.

[Question] Will you enter into a dialogue with the government in order to present your demands?

[Answer] Certainly. By next Wednesday we will request to have our first meeting with the respective ministers. Until now we have allowed them time to become acquainted with the situation. We do not follow party orders. As leadership of ADEDY we are above party interests. We will demand from the government what we demanded last year from the previous government.

The Communique'

In its lengthy communique', the executive committee of ADEDY emphasized the following points among others:

- 1. Representatives of the Federation of Teachers and the Federation of Secondary School Teachers, after having tried, at the beginning of day-before-yesterday's general council of ADEDY to inject partisan politics into the discussion, attempted to impose their views on the overwhelming majority. These views are:
- a) The civil servant class should not submit any demands to the government.
- b) The resignation of ADEDY's leadership.
- c) To disorganize ADEDY and turn its interests mainly towards international ploitical topics.
- 2. The withdrawal of the 22 councilors was condemned by the remaining 55 councilors who rejected the attempt by hte representatives of the DOE and OLME to do away with trade union freedoms and democratic procedures.
- 3. The leadership of ADEDY is not only legally and democratically elected (there is actually a judicial decision on this), but representative as well as proven by the presence of the primary and secondary teachers in the administration of ADEDY. Within many of these organizations, which talk about a clean-up, there is indeed a need for a clean-up. A concrete example is given by what is happening within the Teachers Federation, the largest civil servant organization. Approximately 40 percent of the elementary school teachers have been excluded by the leadership of DOE because of the majoritary system in force and which the present leadership of DOE stubbornly refuses to change into a simple proportional system. The leadership of the same federation for years has refused to enroll as members of DOE six teachers' associations in the country. The present president of the Teachers Federation and other members of its administration have not been elected by the rank and file members, but according to a fossilized article in the by-laws of DOE which since 1978, allows candidacy for administrative offices in DOE without prior membership as a representative in the general aasembly of DOE.

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JAN. 12, 1982